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THE KIDS ARE ONLINE: 
THE INTERNET, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND THE AMENDED 
FEDERAL KIDNAPPING ACT 
Michele Martinez Campbell* 
Should kidnapping be a federal crime where use of the Internet or other telecommunications 
facilities is central to the crime’s execution, but the physical act itself takes place within the borders 
of a single state?  Through the case study of the harrowing kidnapping and murder of twelve-year-
old Brooke Bennett, this article examines a uniquely twenty-first century legal question about 
federalism, technology and criminal law.   
In 2006, Congress amended the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), expanding 
federal jurisdiction to reach kidnappings in which the channels or facilities of interstate commerce 
were used to commit the crime, even when the physical kidnapping occurred within the borders of a 
single state.  The amendment was contained in a provision of the Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act of 2006, and was expressly intended to permit federal jurisdiction over intrastate 
kidnappings that resulted from Internet child predation.  The constitutionality of the amended 
§ 1201(a)(1) is now being challenged on Commerce Clause grounds in several federal district 
courts.   
This article defends the statute, and, more broadly, attempts to rebut the aggressive doctrinal 
attack on federal prosecution of violent crime waged since United States v. Lopez, particularly 
as it relates to “jurisdictional-elements” statutes, i.e., those statutes that premise federal authority 
on use of the channels or facilities of interstate commerce.  Jurisdictional-elements statutes are the 
next frontier in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  This article offers a new model of federal 
prosecution of intrastate violent crime in Lopez Second Category cases that relies on a meaningful 
application of the “nexus requirement” contained in § 1201(a)(1) and similar statutes, thus 
rebutting modern federalist critiques that argue the federal government is overreaching when it 
brings such cases. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 217 
I. LOPEZ SECOND CATEGORY JURISDICTIONAL-ELEMENTS 
PROVISIONS UNDER THE GUN ................................................ 219 
A. Policy Context:  The ABA Report ................................. 220 
B. Doctrinal Context:  Modern Commerce Clause Cases 
Are All Lopez Third Category ....................................... 224 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School.  The author would like to thank Profes-
sors Oliver Goodenough of Vermont Law School and Michael Mannheimer of Salmon P. 
Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University, for their comments and guidance; 
Jason Hart, Vermont Law School J.D. Candidate 2012, and Christina Asbee, Vermont Law 
School J.D. 2011, for their excellent research, and Lawyer Librarian Cynthia Lewis for her 
research guidance. 
216 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
C. Lopez's “Three Categories” Analysis ............................... 227 
D. Morrison:  Another New Federalist Victory in Another 
Lopez Third Category Case ........................................... 230 
E. Gonzalez v. Raich:  The Outer Boundary of Lopez 
Third Category Analysis ................................................. 232 
F. Modern Federalism and “Jurisdictional-Element” 
Statutes ........................................................................... 234 
II. THE AMENDED FEDERAL KIDNAPPING ACT’S 
JURISDICTIONAL-ELEMENTS PROVISION ................................. 238 
A. Legislative History Shows That § 1201(a)(1) Is a 
Proper Exercise of Commerce Clause Jurisdiction ...... 238 
B. Because the Internet and Telecommunications Facil-
ities  Are Facilities of Interstate Commerce,  
§ 1201(a)(1) Is a Proper Exercise of Commerce 
Clause Jurisdiction ......................................................... 243 
C. Federal Courts Addressing the § 1201(a)(1) Have 
Upheld It Against Commerce Clause Challenges ........ 248 
1. District Court Rulings on Facial Challenges 
Prior to United States v. Jacques ................................ 249 
2. The Facial Challenge to § 1201(a)(1) in United 
States v. Jacques ......................................................... 251 
III. A PROPOSAL FOR THE EXERCISE OF CONCURRENT 
JURISDICTION THAT REBUTS THE MYTH OF “INFINITE 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION” ........................................................ 252 
A. The Infinite Jurisdiction Critique Appliedd to 
§ 1201(a)(1) ................................................................... 253 
B. Concurrent Jurisdiction and a Meaningful Federal 
Nexus Requirement Render “Infinite Jurisdiction” a 
Merely Imaginary Threat ............................................... 255 
1. Concurrent Jurisdiction ...................................... 256 
2. Federal Nexus Requirement ................................ 258 
C. Section 1201(a)(1)’s Federal Nexus Requirement in 
Action ............................................................................. 259 
1. The Federal Nexus Requirement in Augustin 
and Ochoa ............................................................ 260 
2. Application of the Federal Nexus Requirement 
by the Jacques Court ............................................. 262 
3. A Proposal For Ensuring Proper Federal Nexus 
Review Through Jury Instructions ....................... 267 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 268 
 
Oct. 2011] THE KIDS ARE ONLINE 217 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Brooke Bennett was a twelve-year-old girl growing up in a small 
Vermont town.1  She had a crush on a local boy, and like any young 
girl, she loved to talk about him with her confidant, a cousin her own 
age.  Brooke was unaware that this cousin—a girl identified in court 
documents as “J[uvenile]-1”2—had a terrible secret.  For years, since 
the time she was eight years old, J1 had been sexually abused by her 
stepfather, a registered sex offender named Michael Jacques.  Jacques 
used the Internet and cell phone text messaging to create an elabo-
rate and terrifying alternate reality, convincing J1 that she had been 
targeted by a bogus criminal syndicate called the “Breckenridge Pro-
gram” that would kill her if she refused to submit to his will.  At first, 
Breckenridge’s demands took the form of sexual intercourse with her 
“trainer,” Jacques.  But when Jacques decided he wanted Brooke, too, 
he began an elaborate, Internet and text-message based campaign to 
convince J1 that she must lure Brooke into three-way sex or “Brecke-
nridge” would punish her.  Perhaps realizing that Brooke would nev-
er agree, Jacques’s plan metastasized, and he decided to kidnap and 
rape Brooke, then kill her.  In May and June of 2008, Jacques sent J1 
literally hundreds of email and text messages, both from himself and 
from fictional “Breckenridge” members, convincing J1 that Brooke 
had to be “terminated” because she was planning to go to the police 
and accuse Jacques of rape.3  Using the knowledge of Brooke’s inno-
cent crush against her, Jacques concocted phony text messages that 
appeared to be from the local boy, inviting her to a pool party at J1’s 
house (which was also Jacques’s house).  He forwarded the messages 
to J1, who forwarded them to Brooke, pretending the boy was too shy 
to invite Brooke directly.  Brooke fell for it.  On June 25, 2008, she 
went to Jacques’s house, expecting to find her crush, but Jacques was 
waiting for her instead.  He drugged her and sexually abused her for 
many hours, then strangled her and buried her body in a shallow 
grave.  To throw the police off his trail, Jacques hacked Brooke’s 
MySpace page and posted a message suggesting she had run away. 
Kidnapping, rape and murder are age-old crimes.  But in its use of 
emails, texting and social media, the murder of Brooke Bennett is 
 
 1 The following account is based on the Statement of Facts in the Memorandum of the 
United States in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count 1 of the Indictment, 
United States v. Jacques, No. 2:08-CR-117 (D. Vt. Feb. 26, 2010) [hereinafter, “Jacques 
Memo”].  The case is still pending, and the jury has not yet made a final determination of 
the truth of these allegations. 
 2 See, e.g., id. at 2. 
 3 Id. 
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thoroughly modern, and presents a uniquely twenty-first century legal 
question about federalism and the criminal law.  The physical con-
duct relating to Brooke’s kidnapping and murder took place entirely 
within the borders of the state of Vermont.  Yet, many other critical 
aspects of the crime—without which it could not have succeeded—
unfolded in cyberspace.  Jacques’s use of these technologies in com-
mitting the crime allowed federal prosecutors to charge him with 
kidnapping resulting in death under a recent 2006 amendment to 
the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), passed as part of 
the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006.4  That 
amendment expanded federal jurisdiction to reach kidnappings in 
which the channels or facilities of interstate commerce were used to 
commit the crime, even when the physical kidnapping occurred with-
in the borders of a single state.5  Indeed, the defense’s first substan-
tive motion in United States v. Jacques was a Commerce Clause-based 
challenge to the constitutionality of this amendment to the Federal 
Kidnapping Act.6  This Article defends the amended Federal Kidnap-
ping Act against such a challenge, and more broadly, attempts to re-
but the aggressive doctrinal attack on federal prosecution of violent 
crime waged since United States v. Lopez,7 particularly as it relates to 
 
 4 See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 
587 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).  The Act con-
tained a variety of new provisions and amendments to existing federal laws intended spe-
cifically to address on-line sexual predation of children. 
 5 Prior to this amendment, Jacques could not have been charged federally because the vic-
tim did not travel across a state border.  Instead, he would have been charged with kid-
napping under Vermont law, and would not be facing the death penalty, which is not 
sanctioned in Vermont. Several commentators have addressed the constitutional and fe-
deralism issues arising from application of the federal death penalty in states that do not 
permit capital punishment.  See, e.g., Miguel A. Lopez, Recent Developments, Federalism by 
Jury in United States v. Fell, 33 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 375, 377 (2010) (addressing Sixth 
Amendment concerns relating to a federal judge’s dismissal of a juror who expressed op-
position to capital punishment in a Vermont-based case); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, 
When the Federal Death Penalty is “Cruel and Unusual,” 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 819, 821 (2006) 
(arguing that “the Eighth Amendment proscription of ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ 
prohibits the federal government from imposing a sentence of death in any State that 
does not itself impose that punishment”); Sean M. Morton, Comment, Death Isn’t Welcome 
Here:  Evaluating the Federal Death Penalty in the Context of a State Constitutional Objection to 
Capital Punishment, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1435, 1463 (2001) (arguing that the Eighth Amend-
ment definition of “cruel and unusual punishments” should be judged according to pre-
vailing “community standards” in the states where the death penalty would be imposed). 
 6 See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count 1 of the Indictment, United States v. Jacques, 
No. 2:08-CR-117 (D. Vt. Jan. 8, 2010).  As will be discussed in detail below, the district 
court upheld the statute against a constitutional challenge and denied this motion. 
 7 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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“jurisdictional-element”8 statutes—those statutes that premise federal 
authority on use of the channels or facilities of commerce. 
Part I of this Article will describe the debate surrounding jurisdic-
tional-elements provisions like the amended Federal Kidnapping Act 
and will argue against the modern federalist attack on such statutes.  
Jurisdictional-elements statutes clearly fall into the Second Category 
of cases declared by United States v. Lopez to be properly within Con-
gress’s Commerce Clause authority.  Yet modern federalists attack 
them anyway, and indeed oppose virtually all federal prosecution of 
intrastate violent crime, on purely ideological grounds that make no 
sense as a matter of doctrine or practice.  Part II will focus on the ju-
risdictional-elements provision of the amended Federal Kidnapping 
Act,9 with special reference to the case study of United States v. Jacques, 
to demonstrate that the statute both meets doctrinal requirements 
for constitutionality under the Commerce Clause and implicates a le-
gitimate federal interest.  Part III will offer a model of federal prose-
cution of intrastate violent crime in Lopez Second Category cases that 
relies on a meaningful application of the “nexus requirement” al-
ready contained in § 1201(a)(1)’s jurisdictional-elements provision, 
and other similar statutes, and therefore disproves accusations of fed-
eral overreaching. 
I. LOPEZ SECOND CATEGORY JURISDICTIONAL-ELEMENTS 
PROVISIONS UNDER THE GUN 
The Commerce Clause-based critique of the statute under which 
Jacques is charged—the 2006 Adam Walsh Act amendment to the 
Federal Kidnapping Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)—arises in 
the broader context of doctrinal and policy challenges to federal 
criminal jurisdiction since United States v. Lopez, which themselves 
must be understood against the backdrop of conservative attacks on 
federal power generally.  Modern federalists have sought aggressively 
to dismantle federal power and have been using the Commerce 
Clause as their primary weapon since the Rehnquist Court decided 
Lopez.  This Article draws a line at jurisdictional-elements statutes 
such as the amended Federal Kidnapping Act and argues that, as a 
 
 8 Jurisdictional-element or -elements statutes are those federal criminal statutes that “add[] 
to the criminal activity a specific link to interstate commerce.  This link is an element of 
the crime, and the prosecution must prove it as part of its case.”  George D. Brown, Coun-
terrevolution?—National Criminal Law After Raich, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 998 (2005). 
 9 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006). 
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matter of both doctrine and practice, modern federalist attacks on 
the statute are overblown and misleading. 
As will be established below, § 1201(a)(1) is a Lopez Second Cate-
gory statute, meaning that Congress’s power to reach the kidnap-
pings in question is premised on use of the facilities of interstate 
commerce.  This section will begin by addressing the policy context 
in which the modern federalist critique of federal criminal statutes 
has arisen, and will argue that it is an overheated environment in 
which a purposely alarmist view of expansive federal power has come 
to predominate.  This section will then examine the Supreme Court’s 
modern Commerce Clause cases—Lopez, Morrison, and Raich—and 
demonstrate that they are limited to Lopez Third Category statutes 
that fail to include a jurisdictional element narrowly tailoring the 
regulation of crime to Congress’s legitimate authority under the 
Commerce Clause.  This section will conclude by explaining that the 
extension of the modern federalist critique to Second Category sta-
tutes such as the amended Federal Kidnapping Act is warranted nei-
ther by doctrinal Commerce Clause concerns nor by the facts of exist-
ing federal prosecutions, but rather arises out of an ideological 
opposition to federal power. 
A.  Policy Context:  The ABA Report 
Starting in the late 1980s, with Chief Justice Rehnquist as a lead-
ing voice, modern federalist judges and scholars began an aggressive 
campaign against federal regulation generally, focusing on what they 
viewed as encroachment by the federal government into traditionally 
state functions.  Federal enforcement of criminal law emerged as a 
significant front in this war.  Modern federalists asserted that the role 
of the federal government in prosecuting crime had expanded 
beyond what they viewed as the Framers’ intent that crime be han-
dled by local authorities.10  This “overfederalization” argument asserts 
that the Framers, by failing to create a federal police power, demon-
strated an intent to leave the enforcement of criminal laws to the 
states. 
This theory has been countered on a number of grounds.  Some 
commentators have argued that it lacks support in the text of the 
Constitution and instead arises from a “misunderstanding” rooted in: 
 
 10 Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
247, 247 n.1 (1997) (listing early articles and speeches arguing that crime has been over-
federalized). 
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the Supreme Court’s broad language in Lopez and Morrison asserting that 
matters traditionally viewed as “local”—including the prosecution of vio-
lent crimes normally brought in state and local courts—are reserved in 
some way from regulation by the national government . . . . This applica-
tion of federalism creates a new form of judicial supervisory authority to 
invoke a vague constitutional limitation—one not mentioned explicitly in the 
Constitution—to limit the national government’s power to pursue crimi-
nal prosecutions.11 
Others have argued that the “separate spheres” view is simply another 
manifestation of the originalist interpretation of the Constitution.  As 
such, it is outdated and long superseded by the modern, interpretive 
approach, which acknowledges the impact of social, economic, and 
technological changes on the law in general, and criminal enforce-
ment in particular.12  This Article does not attempt to resolve what the 
Framers intended the division of responsibility to be between the 
state and federal governments regarding criminal enforcement.  In-
stead, it argues that the modern federalists’ overriding goal of limit-
ing the power of the federal government has taken on a life of its own 
in this area, resulting in an ideologically driven opposition to any and 
all federal criminal enforcement.  This opposition now extends even 
to categories of statutes that the Supreme Court has previously held 
to be legitimate exercises of federal power and that serve a manifest 
and legitimate federal interest.  The amended Federal Kidnapping 
Act is such a statute. 
In 1998, the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section is-
sued a report entitled, “The Federalization of Criminal Law” (herei-
nafter, “the ABA Report”),13 that became a rallying cry for modern 
federalists.  The ABA Report’s impact was so significant that it is now 
widely accepted that criminal law is “overfederalized,” despite obvious 
flaws in the reasoning of the ABA Report and a patently alarmist mes-
sage.  The ABA Report created the conditions in which modern fede-
ralists have been able to expand their critique beyond the parameters 
set by the Court’s modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence to en-
compass an attack on all federal prosecution of violent crime. 
The ABA Report surveyed criminal law in the latter part of the 
twentieth century and painted a frightening picture of an out-of-
 
 11 Peter J. Henning, Misguided Federalism, 68 MO. L. REV. 389, 395–96 (2003) (emphasis add-
ed). 
 12 See Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty Years of the Federalization of Criminal Law:  Sounding the Alarm or 
“Crying Wolf?” 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1317, 1349 (2000) (“The writer submits that the Task 
Force view of the constitutional allocation of legislative power regarding criminal law en-
forcement is of a system frozen in amber.”). 
 13 JAMES A. STRAZZELLA, TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, THE 
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 2 (1998). 
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control federal government usurping the criminal enforcement func-
tion that federalists believe properly rests with the states.  In support 
of this position, the ABA Report focused on data relating to the abso-
lute number of federal crimes, asserting “that the evidence demon-
strated a recent dramatic increase in the number and variety of fed-
eral crimes . . . . [that] significantly overlaps crimes traditionally 
prosecuted by the states.”14  The ABA Report recounted and thus for-
ever popularized the oft-repeated figure that there were over 3000 
federal crimes on the books,15 and noted with alarm that “[m]ore than 
40% of the federal criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have been 
enacted since 1970.”16 
However, this critique failed to consider in any detail what these 
post-1970 crimes were, what reasons were given for their enactment, 
or how the percentage increase in federal crimes compared to the in-
crease in state criminal statutes or prosecutions in a similar time pe-
riod.  No serious effort was made to analyze whether the newly 
enacted statutes were necessary, whether they served a legitimate fed-
eral interest, or whether they addressed conduct that the states lacked 
resources or jurisdiction to reach.  In place of any detailed analysis of 
the federal criminal statutes enacted, the Task Force simply asserted 
that, “a major reason for the federalization trend—even when federal 
prosecution of these crimes may not be necessary or effective—is that 
federal crime legislation is politically popular.”17  The support for this 
proposition was that “more than one source” had stated this view to 
the Task Force.18 
The ABA Report’s concern that local criminal jurisdiction had 
been usurped by the federal government has been effectively rebut-
ted with statistical evidence that focuses not on the raw number of 
crimes added to the federal criminal code in recent decades but ra-
ther on the relative proportion of state versus federal prosecutions 
during a similar time period.  Describing the picture of exploding 
federal enforcement as “essentially false,” Professors Stacy and Dayton 
have argued that, “a considerable body of statistical evidence reveals 
that the national government’s . . . share of overall enforcement has 
actually declined for more than the last half century.”19 
 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 9–10 n.11. 
 16 Id. at 7. 
 17 Id. at 15. 
 18 Id. at 2. 
 19 Stacy & Dayton, supra note 10, at 252. 
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This factual rebuttal of the ABA Report’s position on overfederali-
zation is borne out by a telling statistic contained within the ABA Re-
port itself.  The ABA Report reviews the frequency of prosecution of 
selected federal crimes that overlap state jurisdiction, and finds:  
“The key point is that federal prosecutions comprise less than 5% of 
all the prosecutions in the nation.  The other 95% are state and local 
prosecutions.”20  The fact that less than five percent of criminal pros-
ecutions are federal would logically seem to undermine the ABA Re-
port’s hypothesis of an out-of-control federal government usurping 
state enforcement functions.  Yet, surprisingly, the ABA Report draws 
the opposite conclusion from this fact, asserting that the increase in 
the raw number of federal crimes, when combined with the fact that 
the proportion of federal prosecutions remains low, represents “sym-
bolic book prohibitions with few actual prosecutions.”21  In other 
words, the Report attempts to discount the tiny incidence of federal 
prosecutions as yet more evidence of unjustified increase in federal 
crimes. 
The Report fails to consider any alternative explanation for the 
fact that the raw number of federal crimes has risen while the federal 
share of prosecutions has remained so small.  A much more logical 
explanation advanced by a number of commentators is that federal 
authorities exercise appropriate self-limitation, and restrict prosecu-
tion under statutes creating concurrent federal/state jurisdiction to 
cases where a legitimate federal interest is present.  For example, 
Litman and Greenberg detail the United States Department of Jus-
tice’s “Petite Policy,” which “severely restricts” the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction to “exceptional cases in which important federal interests 
outweigh the considerations generally militating against federal in-
volvement in areas regulated by the states.”22  Other commentators 
have described the exercise of federal prosecutorial discretion as 
proper where federal resources are necessary to enforcement because 
of the group or interstate nature of the criminal conduct.23  An ap-
propriate self-limitation argument certainly makes more sense than 
the ABA Report’s that Congress has rushed in to create so many un-
needed criminal statutes that they sit on the books unprosecuted. 
 
 20 ABA Report, supra note 13, at 19. 
 21 Id. at 53. 
 22 Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Dual Prosecutions, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 72, 73 (1996). 
 23 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., & Hon. John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime:  Advan-
tages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1101–02 (1995) (discussing how the in-
terstate nature of “organized crime” warrants federal prosecution). 
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This Article offers a third explanation for the federal govern-
ment’s continuing tiny share of prosecutions, one that dovetails neat-
ly with the doctrinal discussion regarding the Lopez categories set 
forth below.  As will be fully explained, Lopez First and Second Cate-
gory jurisdictional-elements statutes are intrinsically self-limiting.  By 
requiring proof of use of the channels or instrumentalities of com-
merce in commission of the crime, First and Second Category statutes 
create a “nexus” requirement24 that restricts federal enforcement to 
those limited factual scenarios that implicate this legitimate federal 
interest.  Thus, the exercise of discretion by prosecutors to limit fed-
eral prosecution to cases involving a federal interest is not even ne-
cessary.  Properly drawn statutes do this all by themselves, thus refut-
ing not only the doctrinal preoccupations of the modern federalist 
critique but its policy and practical arguments as well. 
In sum, the ideological and policy environment in which the 
modern federalist doctrinal critique has taken root is a purposely 
alarmist one.  The ABA Task Force Report has succeeded in painting 
a picture of exploding federal jurisdiction that legitimates significant 
restrictions on federal criminal prosecutions in the name of states’ 
rights.  Yet the ABA Report itself has acknowledged that the federal 
share of prosecutions remains tiny, essentially admitting that its alarm 
over multiplying federal power is unwarranted.  A better explanation 
for the fact that such a small percentage of criminal prosecutions are 
federal is that Lopez First and Second Category statutes are narrowly 
tailored and not the monstrous incursion into state authority that 
modern federalists fear. 
B.  Doctrinal Context:  Modern Commerce Clause Cases Are All Lopez Third 
Category 
This section will establish that the Supreme Court’s triumvirate of 
modern Commerce Clause cases clearly carve out “jurisdictional-
elements” statutes like the amended Federal Kidnapping Act as ap-
propriate exercises of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.  Lopez, 
Morrison, and Raich were concerned only with Lopez Third Category 
statutes, where federal jurisdiction is premised not on use of channels 
 
 24 Federal courts typically use the term “nexus” to describe the relationship that must exist 
between proscribed conduct and interstate commerce in order for a statute to be a valid 
exercise of federal power.  See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (invali-
dating a firearms charge for the government’s failure to prove “requisite nexus” to inter-
state commerce); United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1228 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(upholding statute because it “contains an explicit requirement of an appropriate nexus 
with interstate commerce”). 
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or facilities of commerce, but on the more amorphous, vague, and 
thus more easily abused assertion that the regulated conduct “sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce.”25  Thus, the extension of the 
modern federalist critique to First and Second Category statutes that 
clearly limit jurisdiction to an appropriate federal interest does not 
make sense—or rather, it makes sense only as an exercise of the ideo-
logical breed of federalism reflected in the ABA Report. 
United States v. Lopez involved a challenge to the constitutionality 
of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which prohibited posses-
sion of a firearm in “a place that an individual knows, or has reasona-
ble cause to believe, is a school zone.”26  The respondent, a twelfth-
grader at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, was prosecuted 
and convicted federally under the Act for carrying a loaded, con-
cealed .38 caliber handgun to school.27  He moved to dismiss the in-
dictment “on the grounds that § 922(q)(1)(a) is unconstitutional as it 
is beyond the power of Congress to legislate control over our public 
schools.”28  In denying the respondent’s motion, the district court re-
lied on then-existing precedent counseling a broad interpretation of 
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, holding that “the 
business of elementary, middle, and high schools affects interstate 
commerce.”29  The Fifth Circuit reversed on the grounds that Con-
gress had failed to make sufficient findings in enacting the Gun Free 
School Zones Act to demonstrate that it was an appropriate exercise 
of Commerce Clause jurisdiction.30  The Supreme Court, in an opi-
nion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, affirmed the Fifth Circuit, striking 
down a federal criminal statute as in excess of congressional authority 
under the Commerce Clause for the first time since 1935,31 and in the 
process, creating the doctrinal foundation for a broad-based attack 
on federal enforcement of criminal laws that has been underway ever 
since. 
Lopez was ambitious in scope.  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion 
did far more than strike down a single statute; it “synthesized more 
than a century of Commerce Clause activity into a definitive descrip-
 
 25 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995). 
 26 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(a) (Supp. V 1988). 
 27 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
 28 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 29 Id. at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 30  Id. 
 31 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (finding that 
Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act exceeded the power of Congress to re-
gulate interstate commerce and invaded the province of the states). 
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tion of the commerce power,”32 redefining Commerce Clause juris-
diction in the process.  Lopez began “with first principles,” starting 
with the proposition that the federal government is limited by the 
Constitution to acting within its enumerated powers, of which the 
commerce power is one.33  While the commerce power is plenary—in 
other words, a power that “‘may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the consti-
tution’”34—the Constitution indeed prescribes limits, and those limits 
are the ones “inherent in the very language of the Commerce 
Clause.”35 
The Supreme Court had been engaged in working out these limits 
and the boundaries of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority from 
the early days of the Republic.  From the beginnings of Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, the Court sanctioned congressional power to 
legislate in a manner that reached inside states so long as the conduct 
being regulated was “intermingled” with interstate commerce.36  In 
Gibbons v. Ogden, justifying its decision to strike down a New York state 
law that had granted a monopoly over ferry boat operations between 
New York and New Jersey because it burdened commerce among 
states, the Court explained, “[c]ommerce among the states cannot 
stop at the external boundary line of each state, but may be intro-
duced into the interior.”37 
As Lopez recounted, during the twentieth century, the Court, in 
“recognition of the great changes that had occurred in the way busi-
ness was carried on in this country,” steadily expanded Congress’s 
Commerce Clause authority to reach intrastate activity as a corollary 
of the necessary expansion in interstate commerce regulations.38  
While earlier cases had limited Congress’s reach to that intrastate ac-
tivity that “affected interstate commerce directly,”39 the distinction be-
tween direct and indirect effects on commerce maintained in earlier 
cases was ultimately abandoned in Wickard v. Fillburn as unmanagea-
ble and inappropriate.40  Wickard upheld federal regulation of the in-
 
 32 United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1225 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 33 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. 
 34 Id. at 553 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 20 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824)). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Gibbons,  20 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556. 
 39 Id. at 555 (emphasis added) (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495, 546 (1935)). 
 40 See 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (“[Q]uestions of the power of Congress are not to be de-
cided by reference to any formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature 
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trastate production and consumption of wheat for home use on the 
theory that, when aggregated with other instances of home wheat 
production, an individual instance of home production did exert a 
“substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.”41  As Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist explained in Lopez, Wickard “explicitly reject[ed] earli-
er distinctions between direct and indirect effects on interstate com-
merce,”42 and allowed Congress to regulate any conduct that “‘[e]ven 
if . . . . local and though it may not [itself] be regarded as com-
merce . . . exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce.’”43 
C.  Lopez’s “Three Categories” Analysis 
While acknowledging this element of longstanding Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, the Lopez Court nevertheless took a stand 
against wider application of Wickard’s aggregation approach, choos-
ing instead to focus on the fact that the language of the Commerce 
Clause itself requires Congress to refrain from legislating in matters 
that concerned only “‘the exclusively internal commerce of a State.’”44  
In an effort to clarify what categories of conduct might be regulated 
without violating this precept, Chief Justice Rehnquist culled from 
prior Commerce Clause cases “three broad categories of activity that 
Congress may regulate under its commerce power.”45  These three 
Lopez “categories,” which have had tremendous influence on subse-
quent Commerce Clause jurisprudence, were summarized as follows: 
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate com-
merce . . . . Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in inter-
state commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate 
activities . . . . Finally, Congress’s commerce authority includes the power 
to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate 
commerce . . . .”46 
The Court then proceeded to analyze the Gun Free Schools Act, 
whose constitutionality was at issue in Lopez, finding that it did not 
implicate Lopez’s First or Second Categories because it did not regu-
 
such as ‘production’ and ‘indirect’ and foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the 
activity in question upon interstate commerce.”). 
 41 Id. at 125. 
 42 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556. 
 43 Id. (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125). 
 44 Id. at 553 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, , 20 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194–95 (1824)). 
 45 Id. at 558. 
 46 Id. at 558–59. 
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late either the channels or the instrumentalities of commerce.47  In-
deed, it is critical to note that Lopez did not address the constitutio-
nality of any statute enacted under Categories One or Two. 
Finally, the Court then considered whether § 922(q) could be sus-
tained under Lopez’s Third Category, as a regulation that, even if it 
regulated intrastate activity, “substantially affected interstate com-
merce.”48  In determining that § 922(q) could not be so sustained, the 
Court relied on the fact that “Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by 
its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enter-
prise.”49 
Despite a vigorous dissent by Justice Souter arguing that the “eco-
nomic/non-economic” distinction was meaningless and impossible to 
apply in the modern economy,50 the distinction was central to the ma-
jority’s decision.  Yet in relying on the non-economic nature of the 
gun possession at issue to strike down § 922(q), the majority was care-
ful to distinguish another statute regulating similar conduct that 
passed constitutional muster decades earlier by virtue of containing a 
jurisdictional-elements provision limiting the reach of federal author-
ity.  The majority contrasted § 922(q) with 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), an 
early version of the federal felon-in-possession statute upheld in Unit-
ed States v. Bass.51  Section 1202(a), like the statute at issue in Lopez, 
regulated the mere possession of firearms if certain other criteria 
were met—in the case of Bass, that the possessor had previously been 
convicted of a felony rather than that he possessed the firearm in a 
school zone.52  This context was not the relevant factor in the view of 
the Lopez majority, however; rather the distinction hinged on lan-
guage in § 1202(a) restricting its application to those felons who “‘re-
 
 47 Id. at 559. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 561 (emphasis added). 
 50 See id. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Lopez majority’s reliance on this 
“distinction between what is patently commercial and what is not” was a regrettable 
“backward glance” to the “untenable jurisprudence from which the Court extricated itself 
almost 60 years ago” when, in Wickard v. Fillburn, it abandoned what Justice Souter be-
lieved was an equally meaningless distinction between regulations having a direct versus 
indirect effect on Commerce).  Given the “hopeless porosity” of the line between the 
commercial and non-commercial, Justice Souter advocated a different sort of constitu-
tional restraint:  applying rational basis analysis to determine whether a particular statute 
had been enacted in excess of the commerce power, thus requiring the Court to defer to 
Congress’s greater “political accountability.”  Id. at 604. 
 51 404 U.S. 336 (1971).  The federal felon-in-possession statute is currently codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988). 
 52 See Bass, 404 U.S. at 337–38 (“The evidence showed that respondent, who had previously 
been convicted of a felony in New York State, possessed on separate occasions a pistol and 
then a shotgun.”). 
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ceiv[e], posses[s] or transpor[t] in commerce or affecting commerce 
. . .any firearm.’”53  The Court noted with approval that Bass had in-
terpreted this language “to require an additional nexus to interstate 
commerce.”54  The inclusion of such a nexus requirement “limit[ed] 
[1202(a)’s] . . . reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that ad-
ditionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate 
commerce.”55 
Indeed, had the Gun Free School Zones Act contained such a 
provision, the outcome of Lopez might have been different.  The 
Court at the outset of the opinion focused on both factors equally, 
stating, “[t]he Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor con-
tains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to 
interstate commerce.”56  Thus, Lopez accords the absence of a jurisdic-
tional-elements provision equal weight with the non-economic nature 
of the regulated conduct in its decision to strike down § 922(q). 
Nevertheless, this economic/non-economic distinction forms the 
primary legacy of Lopez and has come to dominate the modern fede-
ralist approach to Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a force per-
haps not envisioned by the majority that originated it.  Lopez’s distinc-
tion between purely criminal, non-economic regulations on the one 
hand, and criminal regulations that “substantially affect commerce” 
on the other, clearly arose in the context of and referred to Lopez 
Third Category statutes only.  Subsequent Supreme Court reliance on 
this economic/non-economic distinction has remained limited to 
Lopez Third Category cases.  Yet, as will be described in greater detail 
below, modern federalists have increasingly relied upon this distinc-
tion to attack Lopez First and Second Category statutes as well. 
 
 53 Id. at 337 (citations omitted). 
 54 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. 
 55 Id.  It should be noted that § 1202(a)’s jurisdictional-elements provision is not of the 
same type as that contained in the amended Federal Kidnapping Act, coincidentally codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).  The nexus requirement in § 1202(a) requires an inquiry 
into whether the particular firearms possession occurred in commerce or affected com-
merce, a distinctly Lopez Third Category concept.  The amended Federal Kidnapping 
Act’s jurisdictional-elements provision, however, requires a different sort of nexus—that 
between the kidnapping and the instrumentalities of commerce, referencing Lopez’s 
Second Category.  Professor Brown has referred to those jurisdictional-elements provi-
sions requiring a nexus to the channels (Lopez First Category) or instrumentalities (Lo-
pez Second Category) of commerce as “nexus’ elements,” and those provisions—like the 
one at issue in Bass—that regulate conduct in or affecting commerce as “‘effects’ ele-
ments.”  See George D. Brown, Constitutionalizing the Federal Criminal Law Debate:  Morrison, 
Jones, and the ABA, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 983, 1014 (2001). 
 56 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. 
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D.  Morrison:  Another New Federalist Victory in Another Lopez Third 
Category Case 
The Court reaffirmed and cemented this distinction between the 
economic and the non-economic when, five years later in United States 
v. Morrison,57 it struck down a quasi-criminal statute on the grounds 
that the regulated conduct fell outside the scope of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power.  The statute at issue in Morrison was not a 
criminal enforcement statute per se, but rather a provision of the Vi-
olence Against Women Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981, that pro-
vided a civil damages remedy to rape victims.  Nevertheless, the Court 
determined that the statute’s underlying purpose was the redress of 
violent crime, thus implicating the economic/non-economic distinc-
tion first propounded in Lopez.58 
Writing once again for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted 
that the statute’s proponents did not claim that it fell under either of 
the first two Lopez categories; instead, they advocated sustaining 
§ 13981 under the Third Category, “as a regulation of activity that 
substantially affects interstate commerce.”59  Therefore, the method 
of analysis developed in Lopez for Third Category statutes was deter-
mined to provide the “proper framework” for the Court’s decision,60 
and that meant applying the economic/non-economic distinction.  
“[T]he noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was 
central to our decision,” to strike down the Gun Free School Zones 
Act in Lopez, the Court noted.61  “[I]n those cases where we have sus-
tained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activi-
ty’s substantial effects on interstate commerce”—i.e., in Third Cate-
gory cases—“the activity in question has been some sort of economic 
endeavor.”62  The fact that Congress had made express findings when 
enacting § 13981 that gender-based violence substantially affected 
commerce by virtue of its significant impact on victims and their fam-
ilies was “not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of 
Commerce Clause legislation.”63  Indeed, these congressional findings 
 
 57 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 58 See id. at 625 (“But even if that distinction were valid, we do not believe it would save 
§ 13981’s civil remedy.  For the remedy is simply not ‘corrective in its character, adapted 
to counteract and redress the operation of such prohibited [s]tate laws or proceedings of 
[s]tate officers.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 59 Id. at 609. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 610. 
 62 Id. at 611. 
 63 Id. at 614. 
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seemed only to alarm the Court, since “they rely so heavily on a me-
thod of reasoning that we have already rejected as unworkable”—that 
of aggregating the economic impact of violent crime on its victims 
and finding that the cumulative effect on Commerce added up to be-
ing “substantial.”64  In a passage that has become a rallying cry for 
modern federalists, the Court declared: 
We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate noneco-
nomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate 
effect on interstate commerce.  The Constitution requires a distinction 
between what is truly national and what is truly local.65 
Following this logic, the Court proceeded to strike down § 13981 on 
the theory that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any 
sense of the phrase, economic activity.”66  Since the regulated activity 
was intrastate and non-economic, it followed that the statute had ex-
ceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, and the 
Court therefore struck it down. 
It is critical to remember that, like Lopez, Morrison analyzed a 
Third Category statute.  And just as the Lopez Court had distinguished 
jurisdictional-elements statutes by contrasting the Gun Free School 
Zones Act with the felon-in-possession statute upheld in Bass, the 
Morrison majority distinguished Lopez First and Second Category ju-
risdictional-elements statutes in its analysis of § 13981, making clear 
that its alarm over federal usurpation of state functions did not ex-
tend to them.  Morrison noted that § 13981 was not one of those First 
or Second Category statutes that contain “a jurisdictional element 
[that] may establish that the enactment is in pursuance of Congress’ 
regulation of interstate commerce.”67  On the contrary, the presence 
of “such a jurisdictional element would lend support to the argument 
that § 13981 is sufficiently tied to interstate commerce.”68  This is be-
cause Lopez First and Second Category statutes are premised on 
Congress’s power to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of 
commerce.  Regulation of channels and instrumentalities suffices in 
itself to provide the basis for Commerce Clause jurisdiction; there-
fore, there is no need to engage in a separate analysis of the commer-
cial or economic nature of the regulated activity. 
Despite the fact that Morrison clearly distinguished First and 
Second Category statutes, its passages expressing concern with the 
 
 64 Id. at 615. 
 65 Id. at 617–18. 
 66 Id. at 613. 
 67 Id. at 612. 
 68 Id. at 613 (emphasis added). 
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aggregation theory would, in subsequent years, be appropriated by 
those opposing such statutes.  At its most extreme, this view would 
come to hold that all violent intrastate crime should be viewed as 
beyond Congress’s Commerce Power to regulate. 
E.  Gonzales v. Raich:  The Outer Boundary of Lopez Third Category 
Analysis 
Another five years would pass before the Court again considered 
the constitutionality of a federal criminal statute under the Com-
merce Clause.  When it did, it would be in another Lopez Third Cat-
egory case.  In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Stevens, addressed the conflict between the federal Controlled Sub-
stances Act (“CSA”), which criminalized the manufacture and distri-
bution of marijuana, and California’s Compassionate Use Act, which 
legalized the drug for medical use.69  The specific question addressed 
by the Court was whether Congress’s Commerce Clause power, as 
amplified by its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause,70 was 
broad enough to permit prohibition of a type of intrastate cultivation 
of marijuana that was specifically allowed under state law.71  Despite 
the fact that respondents had cultivated marijuana only locally and 
for medical use in a manner permitted by California law, federal au-
thorities had confiscated and destroyed their marijuana plants.72  
Respondents failed at the district court level, but the Ninth Circuit 
reversed, entering a preliminary injunction holding the CSA uncons-
titutional as applied to them because the marijuana they cultivated 
had remained within the state of California and never entered the 
stream of commerce.73 
The facts of Raich seemingly called out for the Court to reaffirm 
the federalist principles of Lopez and Morrison.  Where Lopez and Mor-
rison involved federal statutes criminalizing intrastate conduct simul-
taneously criminalized by the states, the statute at issue in Raich went 
further, criminalizing intrastate conduct allowed by the state of Cali-
fornia.  The CSA did not merely overlap state authority on a matter of 
criminal justice; it contravened it.  The Ninth Circuit had focused on 
exactly these federalism concerns in enjoining the federal govern-
ment from enforcing the CSA against respondents.  As the Raich 
 
 69 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 70 A full discussion of the function of the Necessary and Proper Clause as an “expander” to 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 71 Raich, 545 U.S. at 5. 
 72 Id. at 7. 
 73 Id. at 8. 
Oct. 2011] THE KIDS ARE ONLINE 233 
 
Court noted, the Ninth Circuit “placed heavy reliance on . . . [the] 
decisions in United States v. Lopez . . . and United States v. Morri-
son . . . to hold that this separate class of purely local activities was 
beyond the reach of federal power.”74 
But the Court did not agree.  Relying once again on the econom-
ic/non-economic distinction developed in Lopez for Third Category 
“substantially affects commerce” cases, the majority found that, 
“[u]nlike those at issue in Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated 
by the CSA are quintessentially economic.”75  The CSA’s statutory 
scheme was “at the opposite end of the regulatory spectrum” from 
those struck down in Lopez and Morrison, which the Court believed 
did not pertain to economic activity.76  Reaching back to Wickard v. 
Filburn for authority, the Court found that the CSA regulated “purely 
local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that 
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce . . . . When Congress 
decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a practice poses a threat to a na-
tional market, it may regulate the entire class.”77  Marijuana was a 
commodity akin to the homegrown wheat at issue in Wickard and thus 
was properly subject to the comprehensive regulatory scheme Con-
gress set up for this commodity.78  The Court determined that wheth-
er homegrown, home-consumed marijuana, when viewed in the ag-
gregate, substantially affected interstate commerce was a 
determination best left to Congress, subject only to rational basis re-
view by the Court.79  The Court therefore reversed the Ninth Circuit’s 
grant of the preliminary injunction, upholding the CSA and affirm-
ing that, even in Lopez Third Category cases, Congress has the power 
to criminalize wholly intrastate conduct. 
Lopez and Morrison had been greeted by commentators as a sea 
change in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, ushering in a new era in 
which congressional authority would be closely scrutinized and li-
mited by a Court hewing to federalist principles.80  Now Raich ap-
 
 74 Id. at 9. 
 75 Id. at 25. 
 76 Id. at 24. 
 77 Id. at 17 (citations omitted). 
 78 See id. at 19. 
 79 Id. at 22. 
 80 See, e.g., Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Federal Power and Federalism:  A Theory of 
Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 921, 
921–22 (1997) (“[Lopez] appeared to undermine long held assumptions about the com-
merce power, along with the validity of a wide range of criminal, social and environmen-
tal statutes . . . . Some commentators . . . offered the even more dramatic assessment that 
the decision signaled a turning point in the Court’s basic approach to federalism.”). 
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peared to have “called a halt to the New Federalism.”81  Indeed, it was 
viewed by some commentators as its death knell.  “Raich largely evis-
cerates the modest steps toward limiting congressional Commerce 
Clause authority that the Court took in United States v. Lopez and Mor-
rison v. United States,” one wrote.82  Lopez and Morrison had failed to de-
fine “economic activity,” leaving it to the Raich Court to adopt a 
“sweeping” definition of the term capable of reaching “[a]lmost any 
human activity.”83 
It remains to be seen whether the Court has truly stepped back 
from the new federalist approach which Lopez and Morrison apply in 
Third Category cases.  Perhaps Raich is simply an example of the 
“hopeless porosity”84  Justice Souter identified in the supposedly air-
tight distinction between economic and non-economic conduct.  
Raich should still alarm proponents of modern federalism in that it 
demonstrates the Court’s willingness to allow federal regulation of 
wholly intrastate conduct in some Lopez Third Category cases.  Cer-
tainly its invocation of the rational basis test—entirely absent from 
Lopez and Morrison—provides fresh hope to proponents of federal 
criminal enforcement. 
In any event, Raich carries forward much of the language from Lo-
pez and Morrison that assesses the validity of Lopez Third Category sta-
tutes solely by reference to whether or not the conduct they regulate 
is properly characterized as “economic” activity.  In doing so, it con-
tinues another critical aspect of modern Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence—that this determination is required only for Lopez Third Cat-
egory cases, whereas First and Second Category cases are set aside as 
distinct and do not raise the same federalism concerns.85  It is this as-
pect of Raich that matters for purposes of addressing the validity of 
First and Second Category jurisdictional-elements statutes, such as 
the amended Federal Kidnapping Act. 
F.  Modern Federalism and “Jurisdictional-Elements” Statutes 
Indisputably, modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence deals only 
with Lopez Third Category “substantially affects commerce” statutes.  
In the years since Lopez, the Court has never had occasion to address 
 
 81 Brown, Counterrevolution, supra note 8, at 948. 
 82 Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich:  Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15 CORNELL J.L 
& PUB. POL’Y 507, 508 (2006). 
 83 Id. at 514. 
 84 Unites States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 608 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 85 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2005) (discussing the evolution of Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence). 
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directly the constitutionality of any First or Second Category statute.  
Nevertheless, as described above, clear language throughout the Lo-
pez line of cases distinguishes First and Second Category statutes and 
makes clear they are not implicated in the economic/non-economic 
distinction created to resolve Third Category cases.  Justice Scalia put 
it best in his concurrence in Raich:  “The first two categories are self-
evident, since they are the ingredients of interstate commerce it-
self.”86 
Federalist scholars acknowledge that the holdings of Lopez and its 
progeny concern only Third Category statutes.87  Indeed, they can 
hardly deny it.  Yet they do not accept this limitation.  Instead, scho-
lars and criminal defense lawyers alike have sought to extend Lopez’s 
principles to First and Second Category cases, arguing that Lopez 
should be construed to place any and all intrastate, violent, noneco-
nomic crime beyond the power of Congress to regulate regardless of 
its impact on the facilities or channels of commerce.  As just demon-
strated, this proposition not only lacks foundation in modern Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence; it flies in the face of it.  The explanation 
for criminal defendants seeking to extend the modern federalist cri-
tique to First and Second Category statutes is obvious.  They have a 
personal stake in striking down the federal statutes under which they 
are charged in order to secure release.  The interest of federalist 
scholars obviously differs.  It can be understood by reference to the 
alarmism of ideological federalism described above in the section on 
the ABA Report.  More specifically, modern federalists have ex-
pressed this alarmism through hypothetical factual scenarios that po-
sit what can be called “endless” or “infinite” federal jurisdiction. 
Ironically, Justice Breyer’s dissent in United States v. Morrison first 
gave these concerns their shape and urgency.  In contending that the 
majority’s economic/non-economic distinction was unworkable, Jus-
tice Breyer noted that the growth of transportation and other tech-
nological advances meant that Congress could reach most intrastate 
conduct simply by crafting a statute that rooted jurisdiction in a state-
border crossing.88  “[I]n a world where most everyday products or 
their component parts cross interstate boundaries, Congress will fre-
 
 86 Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 87 See Diane McGimsey, The Commerce Clause and Federalism After Lopez and Morrison:  The 
Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Elements Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1675, 1679 (2002) (“A 
primary reason why Lopez and Morrison did not spur a revolution is that they limited con-
gressional power with respect to only one of three categories of activity that courts have 
allowed Congress to regulate . . . activities that ‘substantially affect interstate com-
merce . . . .’” (citations omitted)). 
 88 Such a statute would clearly fall under Lopez First Category. 
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quently find it possible to redraft a statute using language that ties 
the regulation to the interstate movement of some relevant object, 
thereby regulating local criminal activity . . . .”89  In raising this possi-
bility, Justice Breyer was commenting on the meaninglessness of the 
economic/noneconomic distinction, arguing that such murkiness 
called out for a rational-basis standard of review that would have 
Congress, rather than the Court, draw these difficult lines.  But mod-
ern federalist scholars viewed his observation as both a realistic threat 
and an invitation to extend their critique to First and Second Catego-
ry statutes, which they promptly did. 
Since then, modern federalists have argued that Congress must be 
prevented from using jurisdictional-elements provisions in bad faith, 
as a ruse to avoid scrutiny under Lopez.90  “Jurisdictional elements 
present serious problems and can easily permit an end run around 
the Court’s efforts to cabin national power.  They are likely to be the 
next battleground in federal criminal law.”91  Jurisdictional-elements 
statutes have been called the “Last Frontier” for federalism in the 
modern era,92 with particular concern reserved for the First Category 
state-border crossing jurisdictional element initially identified by Jus-
tice Breyer. 
In crafting their argument, modern federalists began raising the 
alarming specter of infinite federal jurisdiction, imagining hypotheti-
cal statutes in which there is no end point for federal incursion into 
the state domain.  “The potential problem for conservatives is that 
virtually everything or every person moves in interstate commerce at 
some point, and that nexus elements93 could lead to open-ended 
congressional power.”94  When Congress includes a state border cross-
ing jurisdictional element in a statute, it “leads courts to be lenient,” 
potentially allowing the exercise of federal power in criminal cases 
without “meaningful limits.”95  Modern federalists imagine that Con-
gress will flagrantly misuse such jurisdictional-elements provisions—
 
 89 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 659 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 90 For example, Professor Brown wrote, “[A]s Justice Breyer stated in Morrison, it is possible 
for Congress to attempt an end run around Morrison-Lopez through the use of jurisdiction-
al elements,” noting with alarm “the current Court’s apparent hospitable attitude toward 
jurisdictional elements.”  Brown, supra note 55, at 1009, 1011 (emphasis added). 
 91 Brown, supra note 8, at 951. 
 92 Id. at 997. 
 93 Professor Brown refers to these Third Category jurisdictional-element provisions as “‘ef-
fects’ elements,” as opposed to jurisdictional-elements statutes that arise under Categories 
One or Two, which he refers to as “‘nexus’ elements.  See supra note 55. 
 94 Brown, supra note 8, at 999. 
 95 McGimsey, supra note 87, at 1680. 
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for example, federalizing state crimes by criminalizing intrastate con-
duct where the perpetrator wore clothing that had crossed state 
lines.96 
The only way to solve this infinite jurisdiction problem, they ar-
gue, is to strike down statutes regulating intrastate criminal conduct 
through use of a First or Second Category jurisdictional-elements as 
beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, unless the regulated 
conduct separately satisfies the economic/noneconomic test imposed 
in the Lopez line of cases.  Professor McGimsey writes: 
[T]he Court [should] limit Congress’s use of the jurisdictional element 
by imposing a ‘purpose-nexus’ requirement.  A purpose-nexus require-
ment would require the jurisdictional element to conform both to the 
purposes of the statute and the purposes underlying the Commerce 
Clause power itself.97 
In other words, even Lopez First and Second Category cases, where 
federal authority is exercised in order to regulate the channels or in-
strumentalities of commerce, should be subjected to a vestigial Third 
Category “substantially affects commerce” analysis.  As will be dis-
cussed below, this argument has expressly been leveled at the 2006 
amendment to the Federal Kidnapping Act, despite its inarguable sta-
tus as a Lopez Second Category statute.98 
As will be established in the next two sections, this solution is un-
necessary because the posited problem does not exist either as a mat-
ter of doctrine or in practice.  This is simply another ideologically 
driven instance of modern federalist alarmism that disappears upon 
close examination.  Use of a channel, facility or instrumentality of in-
terstate commerce does provide a meaningful nexus to interstate 
commerce, so long as courts properly supervise built-in proof re-
quirements.  As a practical matter, prosecutions under the amended 
Federal Kidnapping Act, and by extension under other Lopez First 
and Second Category “jurisdictional elements” statutes, require 
courts to vet the relationship of each individual prosecution to inter-
state commerce.  The language of such statutes creates a nexus re-
 
 96 See Litman & Greenberg, supra note 80, at 948 (citing Sarah Sun Beale, Address at the 
Case Western Reserve Law Review Symposium:  The New Federalism after United States v. 
Lopez (Nov. 10, 1995)).  Litman and Greenberg describe this sort of infinite jurisdiction 
hypothetical as “less an analytical attack on the act than an expression of queasiness about 
the prospect of an unlimited commerce power.”  Id. at 949. 
 97 McGimsey, supra note 87, at 1681. 
 98 See Colin V. Ram, Note, Regulating Intrastate Crime:  How the Federal Kidnapping Act Blurs the 
Distinction Between What Is Truly National and What Is Truly Local, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
767, 797–800 (2008) (criticizing the “sweeping jurisdictional language” and “permissive 
wording” of the 2006 amendment to the Federal Kidnapping Act). 
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quirement that in each instance obligates the prosecution to allege 
facts pertaining to interstate commerce in the indictment and prove 
them beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.  As will be described below, 
this nexus requirement fully addresses doctrinal concerns raised by 
the modern triumvirate of Commerce Clause cases, and furthermore, 
simply by requiring lower courts to pay attention to statutory proof 
requirements, disproves the modern federalists’ “infinite jurisdiction” 
hypotheticals.  If the modern federalists’ fears of infinite jurisdiction 
were warranted, there would indeed be a proliferation of federal kid-
napping prosecutions rooted in meaningless and attenuated uses of 
the instrumentalities of commerce.  Instead, federal kidnapping 
prosecutions are few and far between, and—like United States v. Jac-
ques—represent completely valid exercises of jurisdiction rooted in 
legitimate federal interests. 
II.  THE AMENDED FEDERAL KIDNAPPING ACT’S JURISDICTIONAL-
ELEMENTS PROVISION 
A.  Legislative History Shows That § 1201(a)(1) Is a Proper Exercise of 
Commerce Clause Jurisdiction. 
Examining the legislative history of the recent amendment to the 
Federal Kidnapping Act’s jurisdictional-elements provision effectively 
rebuts the modern federalist critique of the amendment and other 
similar Lopez First Category statutes.  Congress acted within its au-
thority under the Commerce Clause when it amended § 1201(a)(1) 
because it acted to preserve and protect an important facility of inter-
state commerce. 
In 2006, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Act, which it described 
as “[a]n Act to protect children from sexual exploitation and violent 
crime, to prevent child abuse and child pornography, [and] to promote 
Internet safety.”99  The Adam Walsh Act is an extensive piece of federal 
criminal legislation containing scores of provisions that have been 
codified throughout various titles of the United States Code.  Some of 
its provisions have wrought enormous change.  For example, Title I 
of the Adam Walsh Act established SORNA, the Sex Offender Regis-
tration and Notification Act, which set up an entire scheme for feder-
al registration of sex offenders who move between states.100  Title III 
 
 99 Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–248, 120 Stat. 587, 
587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16917 (2006)) (emphasis added). 
100 120 Stat. at 590–611.  SORNA has been written about extensively and has been the subject 
of scholarly challenges, including those arising under the Commerce Clause.  See, e.g., 
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established the federal framework for civil commitment of sexually 
dangerous persons.101  It is Title II, however, entitled, “Criminal Law 
Enhancements Needed to Protect Children from Sexual Attacks and 
Other Violent Crimes,” that is relevant to this Article.102  Title II con-
tains numerous provisions amending existing federal crimes to ad-
dress gaps and enhance penalties, all in the interest of protecting 
children, but with a determined and specific focus on Internet safety. 
Title II, § 213, entitled “Kidnapping Jurisdiction,” amended 18 
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) to create the expanded federal jurisdiction at is-
sue here.  Specifically, Title II, § 213 of the Adam Walsh Act amended 
the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), as follows: 
Section 1201 of title 18, United States Code, is amended—(1) in subsec-
tion (a)(1), by striking “if the person was alive when the transportation 
began” and inserting “, or the offender travels in interstate . . . commerce 
or uses the mail or any means, facility, or instrumentality of inter-
state . . . commerce in committing or in furtherance of the commission 
of the offense . . . .103 
This amendment made several changes to previously existing federal 
jurisdiction in kidnapping cases.  Most significant for purposes of this 
Article, it created federal jurisdiction over kidnappings in which the 
perpetrator uses facilities or instrumentalities of interstate commerce 
in committing or in furtherance of the crime.  The statute prior to 
the amendment contained no such Lopez Second Category jurisdic-
tional-elements provision, but rather limited federal jurisdiction to 
the traditional Lopez First Category “channels of commerce” cases—
in other words, cases in which the victim crossed a state border.104  
 
Corey Rayburn Yung, One of These Laws Is Not Like the Others:  Why the Federal Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
369, 407–24 (2009) (criticizing SORNA for allowing “persons who have ever traveled in 
interstate commerce . . . [to] be subject to federal criminal prosecution for crimes having 
no interstate component” and for punishing “persons who crossed state lines and who 
committed a crime wholly unrelated to such travel”). 
101 120 Stat. at 617–22 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16971 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241 et seq. (2006)).  
The AWA’s main civil commitment provision, 18 U.S.C. § 4248, was recently upheld by 
the Supreme Court against a Tenth Amendment-based challenge as a proper exercise of 
Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause in that it was rationally related 
to the pursuit of a number of legitimate federal objectives.  See United States v. Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (upholding the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act as 
constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
102 120 Stat. at 611–17. 
103 120 Stat. at 616 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006)).  A separate amendment 
made by Section 213 to 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) is not at issue in this Article. 
104 It is worth noting that the requirement of a state border-crossing, which has long been a 
feature of federal kidnapping jurisdiction, is a Lopez First Category construct, and thus a 
parallel construct to the use of interstate commerce facilities at issue in the amended 
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The amendment made changes to the state-border crossing require-
ment as well, expanding it in two respects.  First, it allowed for juris-
diction where the government proved travel by either the perpetrator 
or the victim, replacing the prior provision, which had required a 
border crossing by the victim.  Second, it eliminated the requirement 
that the victim be alive at the time the transport began.  These altera-
tions to the Lopez First Category border crossing requirement are 
not the focus of this Article.  Rather, it is the Lopez Second Category 
“instrumentalities of commerce” aspect of the amendment that is es-
pecially controversial, because it allows for federal jurisdiction in cas-
es like United States v. Jacques, where the physical acts constituting the 
crime took place entirely within the borders of one state. 
Congress’s expressed concern with Internet safety is central to 
analyzing the federalism issues presented by § 1201(a)(1)’s amended 
jurisdictional-elements provision.  This concern not only motivated 
congressional action, but also serves as the basis of Commerce Clause 
jurisdiction.  The Adam Walsh Act, and by extension the changes it 
made to the Federal Kidnapping Act, arose out of a legitimate federal 
interest:  the need to keep the important economic tool of the Inter-
net safe for use, rather than having it subverted by sexual predators 
who take advantage of its anonymity to lure child victims.  Congress’s 
power to enact regulations directed at protecting instrumentalities of 
commerce is plenary, as will be established below, and for good rea-
son.  These instrumentalities, as Justice Scalia said in his Raich con-
currence, “are the ingredients of interstate commerce itself,”105 and 
therefore statutes that premise jurisdiction on their use do not pose 
the same federalism concerns as Lopez Third Category statutes. 
Further factual context is useful in understanding the congres-
sional intent underlying the amendment to § 1201(a)(1)’s jurisdic-
tional-elements provision.  Children are by far the most sought-after 
victims for sexual predators.  During the five-year period from 1991 
to 1996, 67% of all victims of sexual assaults reported to law enforce-
ment agencies in the United States were under the age of seven-
teen.106  Twice as many victims of sexual assault were under the age of 
six (14% of all victims) as were over the age of thirty-four (7%).107  
 
Federal Kidnapping Act.  From the perspective of modern Supreme Court Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, First and Second Category statutes are equivalent. 
105 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (Scalia, J. concurring). 
106 HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS 
REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT:  VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS 2 
(2000). 
107 Id. 
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Fourteen-year-olds were the single most likely age group to be victims 
of sexual assaults.108 
Just as children are disproportionately victimized by sex crimes, 
they also disproportionately use the Internet and cell phones, includ-
ing social media and text messaging, to communicate.  Rates of child 
Internet usage have skyrocketed in recent years, driven by the availa-
bility of new, smaller, more mobile technological platforms.  As one 
study noted, “[t]he transformation of the cell phone into a media 
content delivery platform, and the widespread adoption of the iPod 
and other MP3 devices, have facilitated an explosion in media con-
sumption among American youth.”109  Eight- to eighteen-year-olds 
spend an average of 7.5 hours per day, seven days per week, consum-
ing media content and communicating using such platforms.110  Sta-
tistics bear out a tremendous increase in youth access to mobile In-
ternet and communications platforms over a recent five-year period.  
Between 2004 and 2009, the percentage of eight- to eighteen-year-
olds who owned an iPod or other MP3 device accelerated dramatical-
ly, rising from 18% to 76%, while the percentage who owned a cell 
phone went from 39% to 66%.111 
Youth access to mobile Internet and text messaging creates un-
precedented opportunities for sexual predators to communicate with 
minors without parental supervision.  Unsurprisingly, attempts to 
sexually victimize youth using online platforms have shown dramatic 
increases as well.  Between 2000 and 2006, a period that does not fully 
reflect the most recent increases in youth ownership of mobile com-
munications devices, arrests for attempts to sexually solicit minors on-
line nearly quintupled, from 644 in 2000 to 3100 in 2006, while ar-
rests for crimes involving actual sexual solicitation of youth online 
rose 21%.112  A 2006 study (again, prior to the explosion in mobile 
device ownership) estimated that one in seven, or 13%, of youth in-
ternet users were sexually solicited online.113  Only 5% of these inci-
dents were reported to law enforcement, and in 56% of cases, the vic-
 
108 Id. 
109 VICTORIA J. RIDEOUT, ULLA G. FOEHR & DONALD F. ROBERTS, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
GENERATION M2:  MEDIA IN THE LIVES OF 8- TO 18-YEAR-OLDS 3 (2010), available at 
www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/8010.pdf. 
110 Id. at 1. 
111 Id. at 3. 
112 JANIS WOLAK, DAVID FINKELHOR & KIMBERLY MITCHELL, CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN 
RESEARCH CENTER, TRENDS IN ARRESTS OF ONLINE PREDATORS 2 (2009). 
113 JANIS WOLAK, KIMBERLY MITCHELL & DAVID FINKELHOR, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & 
EXPLOITED CHILDREN, ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF YOUTH:  FIVE YEARS LATER 1 (2006). 
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tim told nobody at all—not law enforcement, parents or friends.114  
Technological trends clearly shaped the nature of victimization.  For 
example, in 2006, 27% of online sexual solicitation of youth included 
requests to transmit sexually explicit photographs to the perpetrator, 
a trend that had not been investigated in earlier studies because the 
technology for digital photographic transmission did not yet exist.115 
This factual context explains why Congress chose to address use of 
the Internet to commit sex crimes against children.  They were deep-
ly concerned with the prospect of sexual predators hijacking an im-
portant tool of commerce and rendering it unsafe for use by child-
ren.  This focus on the safety of Internet use was explicit in the floor 
debate on the Adam Walsh Act.  The legislative history of the Adam 
Walsh Act contains no direct reference to Congress’s intent in ex-
panding kidnapping jurisdiction, but specific discussion is hardly ne-
cessary given the extensive focus on Internet safety found throughout 
the legislative history.  For example, during floor debate on July 20, 
2006, one week before its final passage, then-Senator Joseph Biden 
made the following statement regarding a different portion of the 
Adam Walsh Act: 
Advances in technology are a great thing, but many times there is a dark 
side.  The Internet, for example, puts the knowledge of the world at a 
child’s fingertips, but it can also be and is abused by sexual predators 
causing kids harm.  To steal a phrase from my son, who is a federal pros-
ecutor, he told me:  Dad, it used to be you could lock your door or hold 
your child’s hand at the mall and keep them out of harm’s way.  But to-
day, in my son’s words, with a click of a mouse, a predator can enter your 
child’s bedroom in a locked home and begin the pernicious road to vi-
olating that child.  That is why this legislation adds the “use of the Inter-
net to facilitate or commit a crime against a minor” as an offense . . . .116 
Numerous other passages throughout legislative history of the Adam 
Walsh Act express similar concerns regarding safe use of the Internet.  
Senator Allen:  “[C]hild predators have increased their ability to in-
flict harm on our children by exploiting new communications tech-
nologies, including the Internet . . . . The Adam Walsh Act . . . sets 
out several provisions that will dramatically increase Internet safe-
ty . . . .”117  Senator Sensenbrenner:  “[T]he Internet is a remarkable 
tool which has revolutionized the way we live . . . The problem is, 
though, there is a dark underbelly to the Internet . . . .”118  Senator 
 
114 Id. at 20. 
115 Id. at 23. 
116 152 CONG. REC. 15,327 (2006). 
117 Id. at 15,331. 
118 Id. at 15,332. 
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Frist:  “The Internet has become the anonymous gateway for child 
predators to make contact with children, to win their confidence, and 
to victimize them.”119  Concededly, these passages do not directly refer 
to Title II, § 213 of the AWA, the provision expanding federal kid-
napping jurisdiction to include cases in which the perpetrator used 
an interstate commerce facility in commission of the crime.  Yet they 
make Congress’s purpose in enacting that amendment crystal clear.  
Congress was concerned about abuse of the Internet for child preda-
tion.  Members of Congress expressed this concern throughout floor 
debate on the Adam Walsh Act, underscoring their concern not only 
with safeguarding children, but with preserving safe usage of the In-
ternet, an important tool of commerce. 
This legislative history of the Adam Walsh Act, and by extension 
the amendment to § 1201, underlines its constitutional legitimacy.  
Extending federal kidnapping jurisdiction to cover certain wholly in-
trastate kidnappings, such as that of Brooke Bennett described in the 
case study below, does not exceed Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause, because Congress was acting to protect an impor-
tant instrumentality of commerce. 
B.  Because the Internet and Telecommunications Facilities Are Facilities of 
Interstate Commerce, §  1201(a)(1) Is a Proper Exercise of Commerce 
Clause Jurisdiction 
Congress has the power to regulate facilities or instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, and this power 
includes the power to regulate wholly intrastate acts committed 
through use of such facilities. 
There can be no dispute that the Internet is a facility or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce as that term is used in the Court’s 
modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  While the Supreme Court 
has not had occasion to rule on this question, numerous lower feder-
al courts have done so, and no federal court has addressed the ques-
tion and held that it is not.  One notable early opinion is American Li-
brary Ass’n v. Pataki,120 which engaged in a long and thoughtful 
analysis of the interstate and economic nature of the Internet before 
concluding that it was indeed an instrumentality of interstate com-
merce: 
The Internet is wholly insensitive to geographic distinctions.  In almost 
every case, users of the Internet neither know nor care about the physical 
 
119 Id. at 15,344. 
120 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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location of the Internet resources they access . . . . Moreover, no aspect of 
the Internet can feasibly be closed off to users from another state.  An in-
ternet user who posts a Web page cannot prevent New Yorkers or Okla-
homans or Iowans from accessing that page . . . . Commercial use of the 
Internet, moreover, is a growing phenomenon . . . . In addition, many of 
those users who are communicating for private, noncommercial purpos-
es are nonetheless participants in interstate commerce by virtue of their 
Internet consumption.  Many users obtain access to the Internet by 
means of an on-line service provider . . . which charges a fee for its ser-
vices . . . . The inescapable conclusion is that the Internet represents an 
instrument of interstate commerce, albeit an innovative one; the novelty 
of the technology should not obscure the fact that regulation of the In-
ternet impels traditional Commerce Clause considerations.121 
Numerous federal courts have since followed suit, holding that the 
Internet is a facility or instrumentality of interstate commerce.122 
The fact that the Internet is a facility of interstate commerce, 
combined with the fact that Congress acted with the purpose of pro-
moting Internet safety when it amended § 1201(a)(1) to expand fed-
eral kidnapping jurisdiction, rebuts any lingering doctrinal federal-
ism concerns.  It has long been established that Congress’s 
Commerce Clause authority is “plenary” and includes the power to 
reach purely intrastate conduct that harms or burdens commerce.123  
 
121 Id. at 170–73. 
122 See, e.g., United States v. Penton, 380 Fed. Appx. 818, 820 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
“[i]t is well-settled that the internet is an instrumentality of interstate commerce”); Unit-
ed States v. Faris, 583 F.3d 756, 759 (11th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the Internet is an 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, and can be regulated by Congress even when 
communication remains intrastate); United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 952–53 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (agreeing with the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that the interstate nature of the 
Internet, regardless of how and where it is used, makes it an instrumentality and channel 
of interstate commerce); United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007) (con-
cluding that the Internet is an instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce be-
cause it is part of an “'international network of interconnected computers'“ (quoting Re-
no v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997))); United States v. Lane, No. 06–11886, 2006 WL 
2711939, at *2 (11th Cir. Sept. 22, 2006) (holding that Congress has the power to regu-
late immoral uses of the Internet, even if those uses had “primarily intrastate impact” 
(quoting United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004))); United 
States v. Walters, 182 Fed. App’x 944, 945 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding the Internet to be an 
instrumentality of interstate commerce that can be regulated by Congress); United States 
v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 470 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 
237, 246 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the Internet is both an instrumentality and channel 
of interstate commerce)); MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 245 (concluding that intrastate use of the 
Internet amounts to an “instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce” because 
the Internet is “a system that is inexorably intertwined with interstate commerce”); Hor-
naday, 392 F.3d at 1311 (finding that the Internet is an instrumentality of interstate com-
merce that can be regulated by Congress, regardless of whether the use is intrastate in na-
ture). 
123 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1937) (stating that the 
commerce power “is plenary” and may reach intrastate activities that affect commerce); 
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The Lopez Court adapted this principle for use in its Second Category 
cases, clearly stating that Congress has the authority “to regulate and 
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce . . . even though 
the threat may come only from intrastate activities.”124  That proposition was 
established in Lopez, and has been repeated in the Court’s pro-
nouncements on the Commerce Clause ever since.125  It has been re-
peatedly cited, and more importantly, applied, in the lower federal 
courts to uphold federal criminal statutes that reach intrastate con-
duct where the perpetrator used the facilities or channels of com-
merce to commit the crime. 
For example, in United States v. Ballinger, the Eleventh Circuit 
upheld the federal conviction of a defendant who had repeatedly 
crossed state lines during a church-arson spree.126  The defendant had 
mounted a Commerce Clause-based challenge to his conviction, as-
serting that, since each individual arson took place within the borders 
of a single state, no single arson could be described as having oc-
curred in or affected interstate commerce as required by the federal 
statutes he was charged under.127  The Court relied on United States v. 
Lopez128 to hold that: 
Plainly, congressional power to regulate the channels and instrumentali-
ties of commerce includes the power to prohibit their use for harmful 
purposes, even if the targeted harm itself occurs outside the flow of 
commerce and is purely local in nature . . . . Congress has repeatedly 
used this power to reach criminal conduct in which the illegal acts ulti-
mately occur intrastate, when the perpetrator uses the channels or in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce to facilitate their commission.129 
Other cases have expressly applied this doctrine to Lopez Second 
Category cases involving use of telecommunications facilities in 
commission of intrastate crimes.  In the starkest and yet the most 
common example of this principle, courts have held that use of the 
 
see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (holding 
that the commerce power includes authority to regulate intrastate activities that have “a 
substantial and harmful effect” on commerce). 
124 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (emphasis added) (citing Shreveport 
Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)). 
125 See, e.g., Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147 (2003) (upholding a federal statute 
prohibiting the discovery of reports or surveys undertaken to promote highway safety as a 
proper exercise of Commerce Clause jurisdiction); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 609 (2000) (applying the Lopez framework in whether a federal statute providing a 
federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence was proper exercise of the 
Commerce Clause). 
126 395 F.3d 1218, 1243 (11th Cir. 2005). 
127 Id. at 1230–31. 
128 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59. 
129 Ballinger, 395 F.3d at 1226. 
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telephone or other telecommunications facilities is sufficient to estab-
lish federal jurisdiction under Second Category statutes even if the 
telephone call placed or other usage does not itself cross state lines.  
In other words, it is the use of the facility per se that forms the basis of 
jurisdiction, not the interstate travel of the signal. 
In murder-for-hire cases, where jurisdiction is premised on the use 
of “any facility of interstate . . . commerce, with intent that a murder 
be committed,”130 several circuits have held that the call or use need 
not be interstate.  In United States v. Marek, the Fifth Circuit upheld 
the defendant’s conviction of murder-for-hire in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1958131 based on the fact that payment for the murder con-
tract was made using a wire transfer that did not cross a state bor-
der.132  The Court found that “[w]hen Congress regulates and pro-
tects under the second Lopez Category . . . federal jurisdiction is 
supplied by the nature of the instrumentality or facility used, not by 
separate proof of interstate movement.”133  On this ground, numerous 
courts have held that federal jurisdiction will lie under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1958 so long as a telephone call was made in furtherance of the 
murder-for-hire plot, whether or not the call also traveled inter-
state.134 
 
130 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2006). 
131 18 U.S.C. § 1958 is entitled “Use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of 
murder-for-hire,” and criminalizes the use of “any facility of interstate . . . commerce, with 
[the] intent that a murder be committed.” 
132 238 F.3d 310, 323 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
133 Id. at 317. 
134 See, e.g., United States v. Nowak, 370 Fed. App’x 39, 44–45 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding in-
trastate calls made within an interstate telephone system may be regulated by Congress 
because the telephone system is a facility of interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 1958); 
United States v. Means, 297 Fed. App’x 755, 759 (10th Cir. 2008) (concluding that 18 
U.S.C. § 1958 “only requires use of an interstate commerce facility, not interstate use of 
such facility,” meaning Congress may regulate purely intrastate telephone calls because 
they are part of a larger interstate network); United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713, 722 
(9th Cir. 2008) (adopting prior circuit’s holdings regarding the murder-for-hire statute to 
conclude that “intrastate telephone calls made with intent to further unlawful activity can 
violate the Travel Act because the telephone is a facility in interstate commerce”); United 
States v. Fisher, 494 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 2007) (deciding not to address the question of 
whether a showing of intrastate usage of a requisite facility, such as a telephone, suffices 
as a facility of interstate commerce that may be regulated by Congress); United States v. 
Giordano, 442 F.3d 30, 39 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that “intrastate use of the tele-
phone constituted use of a facility of interstate commerce within the meaning of [18 
U.S.C. § 1958]” because “the national telephone network is a ‘facility of interstate com-
merce’ for purposes of the federal murder-for-hire statute” (internal citations omitted)); 
United States v. Perez, 414 F.3d 302, 304–05 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the language 
“‘facility of interstate commerce’ and ‘facility in interstate commerce’ are to be used inter-
changeably,” and wholly intrastate communication can satisfy as a facility if it was part of a 
larger interstate communication system); United States v. Richeson, 338 F.3d 653, 661 
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Other courts have reached this conclusion with respect to 18 
U.S.C. § 2422(b), a statute criminalizing use of interstate commerce 
facilities to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity.  In United States 
v. Faris,135 for example, the defendant raised a Commerce Clause-
based challenge to his conviction on the grounds that, while the tele-
phone calls he made to arrange sexual liaisons with two minors were 
routed through Virginia, he had personally never left the state of 
Florida.136  The court noted that Congress’s Commerce Clause au-
thority “includes prohibiting the use of commercial instrumentalities 
for harmful purposes even if the targeted harm ‘occurs outside the 
flow of commerce’ and ‘is purely local.’”137  It also noted that the tele-
phone calls he made had been routed interstate, but did not find that 
fact necessary to establishing federal jurisdiction:  “Even if none of 
Faris’ communications were routed over state lines, the internet and 
telephone he used . . . were still ‘instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce.’”138  Similarly, in United States v. Tykarsky, the court denied a 
motion for a new trial in another § 2422(b) case based on a claim of 
error in the following instruction to the jury:  “The first element . . . is 
that the defendant used a facility or means of interstate commerce.  A 
computer connected to the Internet through a telephone line is such 
a facility whether or not the communication itself went across state 
lines.”139 
In so holding, the Tykarsky court relied on a rapidly growing body 
of law stemming from the holding in Lopez, echoed in Morrison, that 
Congress’s authority to regulate the facilities or instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce reaches intrastate conduct.140 
 
(7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a showing that the defendant used an interstate commerce 
facility in an intrastate fashion is sufficient under 18 U.S.C. § 1958 to satisfy commerce 
clause requirements); United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 1999) (not-
ing that intrastate use of the telephone network is a “facility of interstate commerce” with-
in the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a)). 
135 583 F.3d 756 (11th Cir. 2009). 
136 Id. at 758. 
137 Id. at 758–59 (quoting United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
138 Faris, 583 F.3d at 759 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)). 
139 United States v. Tykarsky, No. CRIM.A. 03-400, 2004 WL 1813206, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 
2004). 
140 Id. (citing United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Baker, 
82 F.3d 273, 275–76 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Giordano, 260 F. Supp. 2d 477, 482 
(D. Conn. 2002)); see also United States v. Gilbert, 181 F.3d 152, 159 (1st Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that the use of the telephone to make a bomb threat was sufficient to sustain federal 
jurisdiction even absent evidence of an interstate call). 
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C.  Federal Courts Addressing the Amended § 1201(a)(1) Have Upheld it 
Against Commerce Clause Challenges. 
Finally, several federal district courts have addressed facial chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of the amended § 1201(a)(1) directly 
as of the writing of this Article, including the court in the Jacques case.  
All have upheld the amended jurisdictional-elements provision 
against challenges asserting lack of Commerce Clause jurisdiction, 
and instead have held that the amended § 1201(a)(1) is a proper ex-
ercise of the commerce power under Lopez’s Second Category.141  This 
section will focus on the facial challenges to the amended statute and 
the resulting rulings on its place in Lopez Second Category jurispru-
dence.  Subsequently, Section III below will discuss the treatment in 
these same opinions of as-applied challenges to specific prosecutions 
under the amended § 1201(a)(1), which demonstrates how the Lo-
pez Second Category federal nexus requirement operates to limit 
federal prosecution to those cases in which a legitimate federal inter-
est is present, and thus refutes the modern federalist “infinite juris-
diction” critique. 
 
141 It should be noted that two additional unreported federal district court opinions have 
analyzed § 1201(a)(1) since the 2006 amendment, but have addressed issues other than 
its constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.  In United States v. Camejo de la Flor, No. 
8:10-cr-188-T-30MAP, 2010 WL 3324851 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2010), the defendant, a Cu-
ban national living in Mexico, was charged with kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), 1201(a)(2) and 1201(c), as part of an alien smuggling 
scheme whereby he agreed to smuggle a Cuban national to Tampa, Florida.  Id. at *1.  
The defendant allegedly refused to release the victim as agreed and instead made tele-
phone calls to the victim’s family in Tampa demanding ransom.  Id.  The defendant 
moved to dismiss the indictment on grounds that he had never entered the United States, 
and that the indictment constituted an extraterritorial application of the Federal Kid-
napping Act unauthorized by law.  Id.  The district court rejected the challenge, finding 
that the telephone calls placed to Tampa to demand ransom were sufficient to create ju-
risdiction.  Id. at *2.  The constitutionality of the amended § 1201(a)(1) was not at issue.  
Id.  In Vincent v. Smith, No. 05 Civ. 7852 (DAB)(KNF), 2010 WL 23324 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 
2010), the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s Report & Recommendation con-
cerning a federal habeas corpus petition filed by the petitioner, who argued that his New 
York state kidnapping conviction must be overturned because it was preempted by the 
Federal Kidnapping Act.  Id. at *1.  The court rejected the petition, finding that the Fed-
eral Kidnapping Act created concurrent jurisdiction and did not preempt state law.  Id. at 
*2. 
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1.  District Court Rulings on Facial Challenges Prior to United States v. 
Jacques. 
United States v. Ochoa142 was the first unreported federal district 
court opinion deciding a Commerce Clause-based facial challenge to 
the amended Federal Kidnapping Act.  In that case, defendant Sarah 
Ochoa, using a false name, sent emails over the Internet and used a 
pay phone and cell phone to arrange for the victim, a realtor, to show 
her properties.143  While in the basement of one of the properties, 
Ochoa pulled a semi-automatic handgun on the victim, sat on her 
chest, put the gun in the victim’s mouth and demanded $500,000.144  
Ochoa then demanded that the victim drive her to her bank and 
withdraw the entire balance of her account, which the victim did.145  
Ochoa was charged under the amended Federal Kidnapping Act, 
with federal jurisdiction premised on the use of the Internet and tel-
ephones to lure the victim to the site of the kidnapping.146 
Ochoa challenged the constitutionality of § 1201(a)(1), arguing 
that basing federal jurisdiction on mere use of the Internet and tele-
phones when the physical crime had occurred entirely within the 
state of New Mexico exceeded Congress’s authority under the Com-
merce Clause.147  The district court rejected this argument, relying on 
many of the principles discussed above.148  The court wrote: 
As applied to these facts, the Federal Kidnapping Act falls squarely within 
Congress’s power to regulate under the Commerce Clause . . . . Congress 
has plenary authority to regulate the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce.  Both telephones and the internet are instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce.  Therefore, Congress has plenary authority to regulate 
these devices and can forbid their use to facilitate kidnapping—even 
when the kidnapping itself takes place entirely within the borders of one 
state.149 
Ochoa was cited by the district court in United States v. Augustin,150 
which reached the same result, upholding the Federal Kidnapping 
 
142 No. 8-CR-1980 WJ, 2009 WL 3878520 (D.N.M. Nov. 12, 2009).  The portion of the opi-
nion relating to the defense’s challenge to the application of the statute as applied to 
Ochoa is discussed below in Section III. 
143 Id. at *1. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at *1–2. 
147 Id. at *2. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at *3. 
150 No 1:09-CR-187, 2010 WL 2639966 (E.D. Tenn. June 28, 2010).  As with the Ochoa deci-
sion, the discussion of Augustin in this section will focus on the court’s ruling regarding 
the facial challenge to the amended statute.  Section III below will discuss the Augustin 
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Act against a Commerce Clause-based challenge.151  In Augustin, the 
defendants moved to dismiss the indictments against them, arguing 
that § 1201(a)(1) was unconstitutional because it exceeded Con-
gress’s Commerce Clause authority, and that it was unconstitutional 
as applied to the facts of their cases.152  The government alleged that 
the defendants kidnapped the victim at gunpoint after he had 
cheated them in a drug deal and demanded money or drugs.153  The 
defendants took the victim’s cell phone, then forced him to use it re-
peatedly to make arrangements for the delivery of money.154  The dis-
trict court first addressed the constitutionality of the statute generally, 
and held as follows: 
Since the 2006 amendment, no federal court of appeals court has ad-
dressed the constitutionality of the federal kidnapping statute.  One dis-
trict court in New Mexico upheld the statute . . . . The Court agrees with 
the well-reasoned analysis stated in the Ochoa opinion.  Because the sta-
tute contains the express jurisdictional element requiring use of instru-
mentalities of commerce to commit or in furtherance of the kidnapping, 
the statute is constitutional under the second category of Lopez.155 
The defendants’ challenge to the constitutionality of the statute as 
applied to the facts of their case will be considered below in the sec-
tion on the nexus requirement. 
In amending § 1201(a)(1) to allow federal jurisdiction over intras-
tate kidnappings based on the use of the Internet or other telecom-
munications facilities, Congress acted with the intent to regulate the 
Internet and render it safe for use by children.  Case law establishes 
that the Internet is a facility of interstate commerce.  Federal appeals 
courts have uniformly relied on the Supreme Court’s modern Com-
merce Clause cases to hold that use of the Internet or other tele-
communications facilities is sufficient in itself to establish federal ju-
risdiction over intrastate crime, whether or not the signal traveled 
interstate.  The two federal district courts to consider this matter to 
date have relied on all of these principles to find that the amended 
§ 1201(a)(1) is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s plenary power 
under the Commerce Clause to regulate the facilities and instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce.  In short, the modern federalist criti-
que as applied to the amended Federal Kidnapping Act, and other 
 
court’s consideration of the statute as applied to the facts of the particular prosecution 
with specific reference to the federal nexus requirement. 




155 Id. at *3. 
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similar Lopez Second Category cases, has been firmly rejected by fed-
eral courts as a matter of doctrine. 
2.  The Facial Challenge to § 1201(a)(1) in United States v. Jacques 
Turning to our Vermont case study, Michael Jacques, the defen-
dant accused of kidnapping, raping and strangling twelve-year-old 
Brooke Bennett, moved to dismiss the Federal Kidnapping Act 
charge against him, arguing—as had the Augustin and Ochoa defen-
dants—that the 2006 Adam Walsh Act amendment to § 1201(a)(1) 
was unconstitutional on its face because it exceeded Congress’s pow-
er to legislate under the Commerce Clause.156  The personal stakes for 
Jacques were high:  striking down the statute as unconstitutional 
would result in dismissal of the federal charge and re-filing under 
Vermont state law, in which case death would not be an available pe-
nalty.157  On May 4, 2011, the district court denied Jacques’s motion.158 
In addressing Jacques’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of 
the statute, the district court adopted the reasoning of the Ochoa and 
Augustin opinions, stating, “[t]his Court agrees with the approach 
taken by the Augustin and Ochoa courts, and considers that 
§ 1201(a)[(1)] is an example of Congress exerting its power to regu-
late the use of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce under 
Lopez’s Second Category.”159  Jacques had argued that, in any case 
where the federal government sought to prosecute conduct also cri-
minalized under state law, Lopez Second Category analysis should 
not apply.160  Rather, courts should be required to analyze the consti-
tutionality of the statute using “four considerations” taken from Lopez 
and Morrison, which by definition included a vestigial Third Category 
analysis.161  “In effect,” the court wrote, “Jacques would invalidate any 
federal statute that proscribes an activity that is also proscribed by a 
state’s criminal laws unless the activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce.”162 
 
156 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count 1 of the Indictment at 1–3, United States v. Jac-
ques, No. 2:08-CR-117, 2011 WL 1706765 (D. Vt. Jan. 8, 2010).  The defendant also raised 
an as-applied challenge, the disposition of which is discussed below.  See infra notes 227–
31 and accompanying text. 
157 Id. at 3. 
158 United States v. Jacques, No. 2:08-CR-117, 2011 WL 1706765, at *1 (D. Vt. May 4, 2011). 
159 Id. at *10. 
160  Id. at *7. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
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The district court roundly rejected this argument, finding it “fo-
reclosed” by controlling Second Circuit authority.163  The district 
court cited the Second Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Giordano164 
for the proposition that, while Congress’s authority to legislate under 
the Commerce Clause is not unlimited, statutes that contain jurisdic-
tional elements premising federal authority on use of the facilities of 
interstate commerce do not require a separate showing of substantial 
effect on commerce in order to pass constitutional muster.165  The 
court then reviewed case law upholding other federal statutes that 
criminalize conduct also proscribed by the states, but root federal ju-
risdiction in use of interstate commerce facilities:  18 U.S.C. § 2425 
(enticement of a minor using the telephone or other facilities of in-
terstate commerce) and 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (murder for hire using the 
mails or any facility of interstate commerce).166  Finding this authority 
dispositive with respect to the facial challenge to the amended 
§ 1201(a)(1), the Jacques court held that: 
[Section] 1201(a) is an unremarkable and facially valid exercise of Con-
gress’s long-established power to regulate the channels and instrumental-
ities of interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, regardless of 
whether the underlying conduct is also amenable to proscription under a 
state’s police power . . . . As the 11th Circuit stated:  “Plainly congression-
al power to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of commerce in-
cludes the power to prohibit their use for harmful purposes, even if the 
targeted harm itself occurs outside the flow of commerce and is purely 
local in nature.”167 
Thus, as did the courts in Augustin and Ochoa, the Jacques court firmly 
rejected the idea that a Lopez Second Category statute must separate-
ly be found to regulate conduct that substantially affects commerce in 
order to be constitutional.  Second Category jurisdictional elements 
provide sufficient basis in and of themselves to establish the constitu-
tionality of federal statutes. 
III.  A PROPOSAL FOR THE EXERCISE OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 
THAT REBUTS THE MYTH OF “INFINITE FEDERAL JURISDICTION” 
While doctrinal arguments leveled by modern federalists against 
Lopez Second Category statutes such as the amended § 1201(a)(1) 
are thus demonstrably without merit according to federal courts, the 
 
163 Id. 
164 442 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1213 (2007). 
165 See Jacques, 2011 WL 1706765, at *7. 
166 Id. at *8–9. 
167 Id. at *11, (quoting United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
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practical arguments raised appear at first blush to be more troubling.  
Modern federalists acknowledge that the Supreme Court has carved 
out First and Second Category jurisdictional-elements provisions as 
permissible exercises of Congress’s Commerce authority, but they ar-
gue that this carve-out is wrongheaded and certain to lead to disastr-
ous practical consequences.  Specifically, they raise the specter of what 
can be termed “infinite federal jurisdiction,” in which the federal 
government asserts jurisdiction over a greater and greater number of 
intrastate violent crimes based on increasingly minimal uses of inter-
state commerce facilities.  This section will demonstrate that—like 
the general fear of exploding federal jurisdiction contained in the 
ABA Report168—this fear is exaggerated, indeed, unfounded, because 
of the self-limiting nexus requirement built into the amended 
§ 1201(a)(1) and other similar Lopez First and Second Category sta-
tutes.  It will also put forth a proposal for meaningful application of 
the nexus requirement by federal district courts that will resolve any 
lingering “infinite jurisdiction” concerns. 
A.  The Infinite Jurisdiction Critique Applied to § 1201(a)(1) 
The “infinite jurisdiction” critique has been expressly lodged 
against the amended Federal Kidnapping Act.  In a note entitled 
“Regulating Intrastate Crime:  How the Federal Kidnapping Act Blurs 
the Distinction Between What Is Truly National and What Is Truly 
Local,”169 Colin V. Ram argues that: 
[T]he amendment extends federal jurisdiction to kidnapping cases in 
which an offender makes use of the channels or instrumentalities of in-
terstate commerce.  Under the current interpretation of Congress’s 
commerce power, there is no minimum threshold of interaction neces-
sary to create the required nexus with interstate commerce.  Rather, 
simply driving a car, picking up a telephone, or even walking down a 
neighborhood sidewalk satisfies the usage requirement . . . . [I]t is diffi-
cult to imagine a kidnapping scenario in which an offender does not use 
a channel or instrumentality of commerce in commission or furtherance 
of the crime.170 
To buttress the alarming picture of infinite jurisdiction that he 
paints, Ram does not cite to an actual instance of a federal prosecu-
tion based on some minimal or attenuated usage of an interstate 
commerce facility.  Rather, he relies on a Wisconsin state kidnapping 
case which he argues could potentially be federalized given the broadened 
 
168 See supra notes 10–24 and accompanying text. 
169 Ram, supra note 98. 
170 Id. at 770. 
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jurisdictional reach of the Federal Kidnapping Act after the amend-
ment.171  In the case he recounts, a young woman named Audrey Sei-
ler was initially believed to have been kidnapped; police determined 
that her computer had been used to search for local “‘wooded areas’” 
where she could be brought by the kidnapper.172  Ram argues that this 
Internet usage, combined with other uses of the channels of inter-
state commerce in the case, could have provided the basis for federal 
jurisdiction under the amended § 1201(a)(1).173  The case was never 
prosecuted federally, however; nor was it prosecuted by the state of 
Wisconsin, since Seiler was found to have faked her kidnapping.174 
Ram argues that the only way to combat the supposed problem of 
infinite federal jurisdiction is to limit federal kidnapping prosecu-
tions under the amendment to instances in which the intrastate vi-
olence is directed at the channels or instrumentalities of commerce 
themselves.175  “Conceivably,” he writes, “this may occur if the kidnap-
per targets a bus stop or rail station.  Absent this factual prerequisite, 
however, only state authorities may proscribe intrastate kidnap-
pings.”176  Ram’s proposal—which appears to be based on an extreme-
ly narrow reading of dicta in United States v. Morrison177—flies in the 
face of the extensive federal court jurisprudence discussed above, 
which allows the exercise of federal jurisdiction over intrastate con-
duct based on use of the channels or facilities of commerce.  Setting 
aside the doctrinal problems with Ram’s argument, however, it fails as 
a practical matter.  The “infinite federal jurisdiction” concern is de-
monstrably unwarranted given the self-limiting nexus requirement 
built into the amended § 1201(a)(1).  This nexus requirement en-
sures that federal authorities can only exercise their discretion to 
prosecute where a meaningful federal nexus is shown. 
Given that Seiler was never prosecuted federally, this example 
does little to convince a reader that the specter of infinite federal ju-
risdiction under the amended Federal Kidnapping Act is real.  Never-
theless, this hypothetical concern remains central to the modern fe-
deralist critique of all jurisdictional-elements statutes and therefore 
must be addressed with respect to the amended § 1201(a)(1).  The 
answer, as will be detailed below, is that the statutory language requir-
 
171 Id. at 768–70. 
172 Id. at 768 (citations omitted). 
173 Id. at 770. 
174 Id. at 769 n.11. 
175 Id. at 800. 
176 Id. (emphasis added). 
177 Id. at 800 n.233. 
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ing that the usage of the interstate commerce facility be “in further-
ance” of the crime charged is in itself a meaningful limitation and 
not nearly so unconstrained as modern federalists posit.  Legal scho-
lars are in the business of dreaming up farfetched hypotheticals; 
courts are not.  Using the language of a statute to posit the most ex-
treme possible applications is no substitute for analyzing how courts 
apply and interpret the statute in practice.  In practice, as will be 
shown, § 1201(a)(1) has been applied to intrastate kidnapping only 
where the usage of the interstate commerce facility is central to the 
crime.  Thus, the modern federalist attack on § 1201(a)(1) is unten-
able once the limitation provided by the “in furtherance” language is 
examined. 
B.  Concurrent Jurisdiction and a Meaningful Federal Nexus Requirement 
Render “Infinite Jurisdiction” a Merely Imaginary Threat 
The threat of infinite federal jurisdiction under the Federal Kid-
napping Act—and by extension, under other Lopez First and Second 
Category jurisdictional-elements statutes—is simply not real, for two 
reasons.  First, the amended § 1201(a)(1) does not remove jurisdic-
tion over intrastate kidnappings from state authorities and vest it in 
federal prosecutors; rather it creates concurrent jurisdiction that may 
be exercised by federal prosecutors only when certain limited factual 
circumstances are present.  Second, these limited factual circums-
tances form a federal nexus requirement whereby the nexus to inter-
state commerce becomes an element of the crime to be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt in each federal trial.  Any lingering con-
cerns regarding the infinite jurisdiction critique can be resolved by 
meaningful enforcement of this federal nexus requirement, rather 
than by more drastic or farfetched remedies, such as limiting use of 
§ 1201(a)(1) to direct attacks on interstate commerce facilities, as 
Ram suggests, or by striking down the statute entirely.  A further re-
view of the three district court opinions upholding the amended 
§ 1201(a)(1) against as-applied challenges will conclusively demon-
strate that the statute contains a self-enforcing federal nexus re-
quirement that is already being meaningfully applied by courts.  This 
Article proposes amplifying the already-significant nexus requirement 
by adding a mandatory “more than a mere incidental use” analysis—
as done by the district court United States v. Augustin—in order to re-
solve any lingering infinite jurisdiction concerns. 
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1.  Concurrent Jurisdiction 
It is beyond dispute that, both before and after it was amended by 
the Adam Walsh Act, the Federal Kidnapping Act established concur-
rent rather than exclusive jurisdiction over kidnapping cases, and did 
nothing to preempt state jurisdiction.178  The original purpose of the 
Federal Kidnapping Act was “to supplement state-kidnapping laws 
and authorize the use of federal resources to apprehend and prose-
cute otherwise fugitive kidnappers, not to strip the States of their au-
thority to do so.”179  This remains true today:  the miniscule number 
of cases decided by federal courts under § 1201(a)(1) in the more 
than four years since the amendment is testimony to the fact that the 
federal statute is rarely invoked.180  The facts of the cases, as discussed 
above and further below, establish that the nexus to a federal interest 
in each case is meaningful and strong. 
 
178 See Vincent v. Smith, No. 05 Civ. 7852(DAB)(KNF), 2010 WL 23324, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
5, 2010) (stating that the existence of the Federal Kidnapping Act does not mean that the 
regulation of interstate kidnapping is solely the responsibility of the federal government). 
179 Id. 
180 Statistics on the number of cases prosecuted under § 1201(a) since the adoption of the 
amendment in 2006 are simply not available.  The United States Department of Justice 
Bureau of Justice Statistics reports federal criminal prosecutions by broad category of 
crime rather than by statute of prosecution.  Thus, while statistics are now available for 
two fiscal years since adoption of the amendment (specifically, 2007 and 2008), the “kid-
napping” cases reported include all cases initiated in federal courts during those periods 
that might be characterized as involving kidnapping, broadly defined, no matter what 
crime is charged.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2008–STATISTICAL TABLES tbl. 4.1 (2010) (reporting commencement 
of 139 “kidnapping” cases); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2007–STATISTICAL TABLES, tbl. 4.1 (2010) (reporting com-
mencement of 125 “kidnapping” cases).  Reference to the “Kidnapping” category in the 
index of the Federal Criminal Code and Rules demonstrates the overbreadth—and thus 
uselessness for our purposes—of this category.  At a minimum, in addition to kidnap-
pings charged under § 1201(a), the category includes hostage-taking in connection with 
bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113; a number of federal crimes with child or 
minor victims, including sexual exploitation of children involving a state-border crossing 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251; offenses committed on Indian lands and reservations un-
der 18 U.S.C. § 1153; conspiracy to kidnap in a foreign country in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 956; hostage-taking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1203; international parental kidnapping 
in violation of § 1204; involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1583; certain civil 
rights violations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, et seq.; and human trafficking in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1589 et seq.  This category is therefore simply not useful in ascertaining the 
number of cases charged under § 1201(a).  The Ochoa and Augustin cases, discussed in 
detail above, are the only reported opinions prior to the Jacques opinion to address the 
constitutionality of using § 1201(a) to prosecute intrastate kidnappings where an inter-
state commerce facility was used to commit the crime.  See supra notes 142–55.  Searches 
of online sources reveal only a handful of pending cases under § 1201(a), all of which 
other than the Jacques case rely on the traditional state-border crossing to provide jurisdic-
tion. 
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Indeed, concurrent jurisdiction is the rule rather than the excep-
tion for all federal statutes that reach intrastate violent crime.  Mod-
ern federalists have consistently failed to recognize the concurrent 
nature of federal jurisdiction, and thus have failed to acknowledge 
that the federal government is not taking over prosecution of these 
crimes, but rather carefully limiting jurisdiction to those cases involv-
ing a federal interest.  As one commentator explains: 
There is a fundamental flaw in the federalism criticisms of . . . recent 
federal criminal legislation in traditionally state areas . . . . [R]ecent legis-
lation in traditionally state areas [does] not supplant state criminal legis-
lation . . . [but] merely creates concurrent federal jurisdiction, making 
federal prosecutions possible in select areas . . . . [I]n practice, federal 
prosecutions occur in only a tiny fraction of the cases . . . .181 
This is an important point, even if modern federalists might reply by 
saying it is not concurrent federal jurisdiction they object to, but ra-
ther any federal jurisdiction.  This response, were they to make it, 
would simply restate their argument and ignore the doctrinal basis 
established above for federal jurisdiction over intrastate kidnapping 
in those limited cases where use of interstate commerce facilities is 
central to the crime. 
As a matter of doctrine, use of an interstate commerce facility de-
fines a federal interest as surely as does the state-border crossing tra-
ditionally at the heart of federal kidnapping jurisdiction, which fede-
ralists have yet to object to.  As a matter of policy, similar factors 
militate in favor of federal prosecution of those limited cases, such as 
the Jacques case as argued for federal prosecution under the tradi-
tional state-border crossing model.  The resources required to prose-
cute crimes heavily reliant on Internet or telephone usage—i.e., elec-
tronic surveillance tools—are commonly controlled by federal rather 
than state law enforcement agencies.  More generally, policing of in-
terstate commerce facilities such as the Internet and other telecom-
munications facilities is only feasible if undertaken by federal authori-
ties rather than by state governments potentially subjecting users to 
the dangers of inconsistent regulation.182  Thus, in all significant re-
spects, federal prosecution premised on use of interstate commerce 
facilities accords with traditional federal kidnapping jurisdiction.  Its 
 
181 Litman & Greenberg, supra note 80, at 963. 
182 Indeed, the Second Circuit enjoined enforcement of a Vermont statute prohibiting on-
line dissemination of sexually explicit materials to minors on the grounds that state regu-
lation of the Internet violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.  See Am. Booksellers 
Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Thus, at the same time that the inter-
net’s geographic reach increases Vermont’s interest in regulating out-of-state conduct, it 
makes state regulation impracticable.”). 
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concurrent nature means that where kidnappings do not implicate 
this federal interest, they will be left to the state’s concurrent authori-
ty to prosecute. 
2.  Federal Nexus Requirement 
Federal prosecutions represent only a “tiny fraction” of cases in 
which concurrent jurisdiction exists for a simple reason.  Modern fe-
deralists are wrong:  the statutes have been written to contain mea-
ningful practical limits.  In the article containing the above-quoted 
passage, Litman and Greenberg specifically addressed the legislative 
change made to the Gun Free School Zones Act by Congress after the 
Supreme Court had struck the statute down in Lopez.183  Congress 
amended the statute to require a specific showing that the handgun 
possessed within the school zone had moved in interstate com-
merce.184  The authors argue that the revised Gun Free School Zones 
Act meaningfully “demarcate[s] a constitutional line” because it lim-
its the exercise of federal jurisdiction to cases in which the state bor-
der crossing is a cause of the harm—possession of a gun in a school 
zone—addressed by Congress in the statute.185  In other words, there 
is a built-in nexus or causation requirement limiting federal jurisdic-
tion to a small number of cases presenting a legitimate federal inter-
est. 
Federal courts have long interpreted the jurisdictional-elements 
language in federal criminal statutes to create a separate proof re-
quirement that becomes an element of the charged crime.  Begin-
ning with United States v. Bass, the Supreme Court found that the 
presence of such a proof requirement could cure arguments that a 
statute exceeded Commerce Clause jurisdiction.  In Bass, the Court 
rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to a previous version of the 
federal felon-in-possession statute, finding the statute constitutional 
so long as it was read to require proof of a nexus to interstate com-
merce as an element of the charged crime.186  “[T]he nexus with in-
terstate commerce . . . must be shown in individual cases,” the Court 
wrote.187  “And consistent with our regard for the sensitive relation be-
tween federal and state criminal jurisdiction, our reading preserves as 
 
183 See Litman & Greenberg, supra note 80, at 924. 
184 See id. 
185 Id. at 926. 
186 See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (setting aside a conviction because the 
Government did not meet the required proof of a nexus to interstate commerce). 
187 Id. at 350. 
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an element of all the offenses a requirement suited to federal crimi-
nal jurisdiction alone.”188  The Lopez majority specifically contrasted 
the Gun Free School Zones Act with the felon-in-possession statute at 
issue in Bass, finding the lack of such a nexus in the Gun Free School 
Zones Act rendered that statute beyond Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause.189  Federal courts have repeatedly upheld federal 
criminal statutes against Commerce Clause challenges where specific 
jurisdictional-elements language creates a proof requirement de-
manding a showing that the regulated conduct bore a nexus to inter-
state commerce.190  Failure to prove up the required federal nexus 
does not render the entire statute unconstitutional, but rather 
amounts to lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and leads to a 
judgment of acquittal on federal charges.191 
C.  Section 1201(a)(1)’s Federal Nexus Requirement in Action 
Like other Lopez First and Second Category jurisdictional-
elements statutes, the amended § 1201(a)(1) contains a working fed-
eral nexus requirement that has the practical effect of limiting feder-
al prosecutions of intrastate kidnappings to cases in which there is a 
demonstrable federal interest.  This nexus requirement can be ob-
served in action each time courts consider “as-applied” challenges to 
the amended Federal Kidnapping Act.  By raising an “as-applied” 
challenge, a defendant argues that the facts underlying his prosecu-
tion are constitutionally insufficient to support prosecution by federal 
authorities.  Such a challenge triggers a requirement that the trial 
court vet the strength of the federal interest in the prosecution by de-
termining whether the facts as alleged in the indictment establish a 
sufficient nexus between the defendant’s conduct and interstate 
commerce.  Where the federal interest is deemed too attenuated, the 
case must be dismissed in favor of the concurrent state jurisdiction.  
Defendants’ ability to raise these as-applied challenges, combined 
with courts’ serious and meaningful consideration of them, render 
 
188 Id. at 351. 
189 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S 549, 561 (1995) (“[Section] 922(q) contains no juris-
dictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm pos-
session in question affects interstate commerce.”). 
190 See United States v. Trupin, 117 F.3d 678, 685 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997) (providing examples of 
various cases demonstrating that possession can constitute interstate commerce). 
191 See United States v. Keller, No. 2:09-cr-20303, 2010 WL 55508, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 
2010) (claiming that a lack of federal jurisdiction in § 1958 case is better understood as 
one of insufficiency of evidence that a federal crime was committed). 
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the “infinite federal jurisdiction” myth just that—a trope with no basis 
in the reality of our criminal justice system. 
1.  The Federal Nexus Requirement in Augustin and Ochoa 
The opinion in United States v. Augustin,192 in particular, stands as a 
model of clarity worthy of emulation by other district courts in ensur-
ing meaningful enforcement of the federal nexus requirement. 
In order to understand Augustin’s application of the federal nexus 
requirement, we must begin where the Augustin court did:  with the 
opinion in Ochoa,193 which preceded Augustin by seven months and 
was the first federal district court opinion to consider the constitutio-
nality of the amended Federal Kidnapping Act under the Commerce 
Clause.194  After finding the amended § 1201(a)(1) facially valid as a 
matter of Commerce Clause doctrine as described above,195 the Ochoa 
court addressed what it termed “cursory allegations” by the defendant 
that the statute was “overly vague and contain[ed] ‘no meaningful 
limiting language,’” so that “‘it is virtually impossible to imagine a 
kidnapping scenario, however localized, that would not trigger federal 
jurisdiction.’”196  This argument by the defendant, Sarah Ochoa, is 
immediately recognizable as a variant of the “infinite federal jurisdic-
tion” critique raised by Ram and other modern federalists.  The 
Ochoa court rejected the infinite jurisdiction argument in the follow-
ing passage: 
[T]he Act contains sufficient limiting language.  It only criminalizes kid-
nappings when the offender uses an instrumentality of interstate com-
merce “in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the of-
fense.”  Mere use of a cell phone, for example, is not sufficient; the 
offender must use the cell phone to further the kidnapping.197 
This passage clearly limits federal jurisdiction over intrastate kidnap-
ping to cases in which a federal nexus is established through a usage 
of the interstate commerce facility that “further[s] the kidnapping.”  
The court does not discuss the definition of “further” in any detail.  
However, a review of the facts of Ochoa198 shows direct usage of inter-
 
192 No. 1:09-CR-187, 2010 WL 2639966, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. June 28, 2010). 
193 United States v. Ochoa, No. 8-CR-1980 WJ, 2009 WL 3878520, at *1 (D.N.M. Nov. 12, 
2009). 
194 See Augustin, 2010 WL 2639966, at *3 (explaining that before 2006, the Federal Kidnap-
ping Act only prohibited kidnappings when the victim was physically transported across 
state lines). 
195 See supra notes 142–49 and accompanying text. 
196 Ochoa, 2009 WL 3878520, at *4. 
197 Id. (emphasis added). 
198 See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text. 
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state commerce facilities to commit the crime.  (The government had 
proved at trial that Sarah Ochoa used the Internet and telephones to 
arrange the meeting at which she kidnapped the realtor.)199  The 
combination of the language used by the court, and the facts of the 
case establishing direct usage to further the kidnapping, obviously 
suggests that an attenuated usage would not satisfy the statute’s fed-
eral nexus requirement.  On the contrary, Ochoa contains just the sort 
of criminal usage of interstate commerce facilities that—according to 
the legislative history of the Adam Walsh Act described above—
Congress properly set out to police when it amended § 1201(a)(1).200 
The opinion in United States v. Augustin expands somewhat on 
Ochoa’s requirement of direct usage of the interstate commerce facili-
ty to further the kidnapping, employing language that, if followed by 
other courts applying the amended § 1201(a)(1), would lay to rest 
any concern with overly expansive federal kidnapping jurisdiction.  In 
Augustin, the court addressed the constitutionality of the statute in 
the context of a motion to dismiss the indictment,201 and was appro-
priately sensitive to the fact that the averments in the indictment 
were, at that point, simply allegations.  This awareness led the court 
to discuss the federal nexus requirement in greater detail, with par-
ticular focus on its role as an element of the crime to be proved in 
order for the defendant to be convicted.202  The court declined to 
dismiss the indictment prior to trial on an as-applied challenge, writ-
ing that “[t]he jurisdictional requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) is 
a substantive element of the offense . . . . The Court accordingly re-
serves for the jury the determination of whether the use of instru-
mentalities satisfies the statute.”203 
However, in addressing what sort of use of instrumentalities would 
satisfy the statute, the Augustin court performed the functional equiv-
alent of an as-applied review, amplifying upon Ochoa’s usage of the 
“further the kidnapping” language in the process.  After quoting 
Ochoa to reject the defendants’ argument that the amended 
§ 1201(a)(1) allows proof of nexus based on improperly attenuated 
usage of interstate commerce facilities, the Augustin opinion added 
this observation: 
The plain language of the [sic] 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), requires more than 
an “incidental” use of a telephone to satisfy the jurisdictional element.  Ra-
 
199 See Ochoa, 2009 WL 3878520, at *1. 
200 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
201 Augustin, 2010 WL 2639966, at *1. 
202 Id. at *5. 
203 Id. 
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ther, the . . . instrumentality must have been used “in committing or in 
furtherance of the commission of the offense” . . . . This in the Court’s 
opinion requires more than a mere “incidental” use.204 
This language from Augustin is salutary.  As already discussed, 
§ 1201(a)(1), like other Lopez First and Second Category jurisdic-
tional-elements statutes, creates a federal nexus requirement that 
must be proved as an element of the crime.  Augustin and Ochoa hold 
that the § 1201(a)(1) federal nexus requirement demands proof that 
a facility of interstate commerce was used to further the kidnapping.  
Adding the Augustin court’s specification that the usage in further-
ance be “more than merely incidental” would resolve any concern 
with improperly expansive federal jurisdiction. 
2.  Application of Federal Nexus Requirement by the Jacques Court. 
In considering the as-applied challenge contained in the defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss, the court in United States v. Jacques per-
formed the functional equivalent of a federal nexus requirement 
analysis, although it did not employ that terminology.  The effect was 
the same, however:  the court carefully examined the relationship be-
tween the kidnapping and the alleged use of the interstate commerce 
facility (in this case the Internet) to ensure that the usage was not at-
tenuated from the crime.  The defendant’s “as-applied” challenge 
thus triggered a factual review by the Jacques court that fulfilled the 
promise of § 1201(a)(1)’s jurisdictional-elements provision, render-
ing it self-limiting in nature. 
Before reviewing the portion of the Jacques court’s opinion ad-
dressing the as-applied challenge, this Article will provide a more de-
tailed recitation of the facts of the Jacques case than was included in 
the court’s opinion.  The purpose of this review is simply to demon-
strate that judicial opinions assessing the factual nexus between the 
alleged crime and the use of the interstate commerce facility are by 
nature schematic, and often fail to convey the full range and power of 
“nexus” facts ultimately presented to a jury.  This is certainly true in 
the case of United States v. Jacques. 
In its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dis-
miss Count 1 of the Indictment, the government summarized the 
proof it planned to offer at trial.  While the allegations showed that 
the physical acts constituting the crime took place within the borders 
of the state of Vermont, the government describes the kidnapping as 
the culmination of months of careful planning and manipulation, vir-
 
204 Id. at *4 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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tually all of which occurred online or through text messaging.  Docu-
ments filed in the case—in which Jacques is charged under the 
amended Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)—
demonstrate that Jacques employed the Internet and text messaging 
intensively and extensively over a lengthy period of time to plan, 
commit and cover up the crime.205  Given the manner in which the 
Internet and text messaging was used to plan, coerce and direct a 
critically important accomplice, to lure Brooke to the phony “party” 
where she was drugged, raped and killed, and to tamper with evi-
dence in order to divert police attention away from Jacques, it is clear 
that the crime was inseparable from and could not have succeeded 
without the Internet and cell phone text messaging.  The greater part 
of this crime took place in cyberspace; only its culmination happened 
in Vermont. 
Jacques had been sexually abusing another young girl, identified 
in court documents as J1, for years; Jacques had used the Internet 
and cell phone text messages to convince J1 that she had been tar-
geted by a criminal organization called the “Breckenridge Program” 
that would kill her or her family members if she did not submit to 
sexual intercourse with her “trainer,” Jacques.206  In the weeks leading 
up to the kidnapping and murder of Brooke, Jacques used email and 
text messages to direct J1 to assist in luring Brooke to her death.  
Court documents detail hundreds of email and text messages sent by 
Jacques to J1 during May and June 2008, using a variety of email ad-
dresses and purporting to come from various fictitious members of 
Breckenridge.207  J1 was originally told that she had been selected for 
“summer training,” which would require her to acquire Brooke for 
three-way sex with Jacques and J1.208  However, at some point, Jacques 
decided to kill Brooke.  During the second half of May 2008, he sent 
numerous emails and text messages, again purportedly from Brecke-
nridge members, convincing J1 that Brooke had to be killed because 
she was threatening to go to the police and accuse Jacques of rape, 
and instructing J1 to assist in committing the crime.209 
 
205  See Jacques Memo, supra note 1, at 4-7. 
206 Jacques Memo, supra note 1, at 4. 
207 Id. at 4–11. 
208 Id. at 6. 
209 Id. at 5.  A letter written on June 6, purporting to be from Breckenridge to J1, recovered 
from Jacques’s laptop, stated:  
[W]e have recently come to an agreement with Charles, Eric and Jacques regard-
ing what will be done.  To put it bluntly, Miss Bennett will cease to exist . . . . You 
will not be required to participate in the actual termination, but you will partici-
pate in the events leading up to it.  We expect your full and enthusiastic participa-
tion. 
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In the week leading up to the kidnapping and murder, Jacques 
and J1 continued to exchange voluminous, detailed emails and text 
messages planning Brooke’s abduction.210  J1 was instructed to lure 
Brooke to Jacques’s house (which, as the documents make obvious, 
was also J1’s house), using the ruse that J1 was hosting a pool party 
there which would be attended by a local boy Brooke liked.211  Jacques 
created numerous phony text messages that appeared to be from this 
boy, and forwarded them to J1, who forwarded them to Brooke.212  
The text messages spoke of this boy’s interest in Brooke and his de-
sire to see her at the pool party.  Brooke’s texted replies demonstrat-
ed that she believed the phony text messages to be authentic and was 
eager to attend the party:  “‘OMG!,’” court documents quote Brooke 
as texting back to J1, “He really sent those 2 u?  That is awesome.”213  
Brooke then texts J1, “I will talk to my mom!” to get permission to at-
tend the pool party and to sleep over at Jacques’s house the night be-
fore.214 
Meanwhile, Jacques continued to instruct J1 through numerous, 
detailed text messages regarding the logistics of the abduction and its 
planned cover-up.  After being repeatedly pressured by phony text 
messages from fictional Breckenridge members, on June 20, J1 texted 
Jacques that she would “help out . . . with the tie down.”215  Jacques, 
posing as a Breckenridge member, repeatedly commanded J1 to ob-
tain a semen sample in a handkerchief from a local boy that Jacques 
later planted near Brooke’s body to divert suspicion.216  Via text mes-
sage, J1 agreed to obtain the semen sample, informed Jacques when 
she had completed the task, and made arrangements to deliver the 
handkerchief containing the specimen to Jacques.217 
It is impossible to overstate the role played by text messaging in 
the actual execution of the crime.  Jacques and J1 were in constant 
contact via text message from the time Brooke arrived at the Jacques 
residence at approximately 8:00 PM on June 24 (the night before her 
murder), throughout the commission and completion of the crime 
 
  Id. at 8. 
210 See id. at 8–11. 
211 Id. at 8–9. 
212 Id. at 10–11. 
213 Id. at 11. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. (alteration in original). 
216 Id. at 11, 18. 
217 Id. at 11–12. 
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on June 25.218  These text messages covered everything from moment-
by-moment bulletins regarding the timing of Brooke’s arrival, to the 
logistics of the planned cover-up, to discussions of whether Brooke 
was asleep or awake, to statements by J1 concerning how scared she 
was, followed by directives from Jacques to calm down and carry out 
the plan as directed.219 
Finally, on the morning of June 25, Jacques was alone in the 
house with the two girls and ready to carry out his plan.  Jacques and 
J1 texted back and forth, unbeknownst to Brooke, and arranged for 
J1 to tell Brooke that Jacques wanted to show her a “magic trick.”220  
Jacques came downstairs from his bedroom to where the two girls 
were and got Brooke, leading her back upstairs.221  Shortly thereafter, 
Jacques came down again and instructed J1 to leave the house, telling 
her that the taser was not working.222  Even as Jacques raped and 
murdered Brooke upstairs, J1 continued to send text messages to fic-
tional Breckenridge members keeping them apprised of unfolding 
events and telling them it was time to come get the body.223 
Like the kidnapping and murder itself, Jacques’s attempts to cover 
it up were directly accomplished through use of the Internet.  Initial-
ly, Jacques had planned to use Brooke’s cell phone after her murder 
to send text messages to J1 making it look like she was still alive and 
had run off with a local boy.224  Jacques and J1 exchanged a long se-
ries of panicked text messages after Brooke’s arrival at the Jacques’s 
residence on June 24, when it became clear that Brooke had left her 
cell phone at home.225  Through repeated texts, Jacques and J1 devel-
oped an alternative plan:  J1 would obtain Brooke’s MySpace pass-
word, which Jacques would use to access her account and plant a de-
coy story about Brooke running away with the boy.226  That night, 
 
218 The Memorandum does not expressly discuss where Jacques, J1 and Brooke were within 
the house, or whether at times Jacques’s wife was also present.  It is clear from the con-
text, however, that J1 was with Brooke, but that Jacques was elsewhere in the house (or 
perhaps at times not in the house at all) during the many hours that these text messages 
were being exchanged.  Id. at 12–18. 
219 Id. at 12–15. 
220 Id. at 16. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 In one such message, J1 wrote, “The tazor [sic] didn’t work and I’m leaving . . . . Now get 
here now now now.”  Id. 
224 Id. at 12. 
225 Id. at 12–13. 
226 Id. at 13. 
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before he killed her, Jacques accessed Brooke’s MySpace account and 
posted a phony entry that made it look like she would be meeting this 
boy the next morning.227  The next day, after Brooke was murdered 
and buried and her mother had come to Jacques’s house looking for 
her, Jacques and his wife checked Brooke’s MySpace page and “dis-
covered” the post.228  Jacques was subsequently arrested and charged 
federally under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).  Count One of the indict-
ment read in relevant part: 
On or about and between June 20–25, 2008, in the District of Vermont, 
JACQUES unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, 
abducted and carried away Brooke Bennett, and held her for his own 
benefit and purpose, and used means, facilities and instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, namely, cell phone text messages, internet email messages, and an 
internet MySpace posting, in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the 
offense, which resulted in the death of Brooke Bennett. (18 U.S.C. § 
1201(a)(1)).229 
It was this count that Jacques moved to dismiss. 
After denying Jacques’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of 
the amended § 1201(a)(1),230 the district court considered the as-
applied challenge, performing the equivalent of a federal nexus anal-
ysis.  The defendant had asserted that “any use of cell phone text 
messages was too attenuated from the kidnapping to support a con-
viction.”231  Though the defense admitted that interstate commerce 
facilities were used to lure Brooke to Jacques’s house prior to her 
rape and murder, Jacques argued that luring her was not the same as 
kidnapping her; the luring and the kidnapping must be viewed as two 
separate, unrelated events.232  The court rejected this hair-splitting.  
Examining the definition of kidnapping under § 1201(a)(1), the 
court found that proof that the defendant “‘inveigled or decoyed” the 
victim was placed on an equal footing with proof that he “‘kid-
napped, abducted, or carried [her] away’” in the statutory lan-
guage.233  Jacques’s luring of Brooke could not be separated from the 
 
227 The entry read in part:  
 I do want to see you in the morning so please meet me . . . u know where.  I think 
I have a good plan to sneak around this.  My mom will kill me but then I’m going 
2 Texas and she will get over it . . . . OMG if only people knew me 4 real!  See you 
there!  
  Id. at 14 (alterations in original). 
228 Id. at 17–18. 
229 Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
230 See supra notes 156–67 and accompanying text. 
231 United States v. Jacques, No. 2:08-CR-117, 2011 WL 1706765 at *11 (D. Vt. May 4, 2011). 
232 Id. 
233 Id. 
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kidnapping itself, but was part and parcel of the crime.  The court 
wrote: 
A kidnapping that begins with an inveiglement and evolves into a con-
finement by force is one offense, not two, and begins with the inveigle-
ment, not the confinement by force . . . . [T]he government’s evidence 
could permit a jury to conclude that the layers of deception enabled Jac-
ques to entice Miss Bennett to come to his house . . . all in order to keep 
her within his control and for his own illicit purposes.234 
Thus, the use of the interstate commerce facilities was in no way atte-
nuated.  The court concluded: 
Because, at a minimum, cell phone text messaging was allegedly used to 
convince Brooke Bennett that she was assisting in the preparations for a 
pool party . . . there is probable cause to believe that an instrumentality 
of interstate commerce was used to commit or to facilitate the commis-
sion of a kidnapping.  The application of § 1201(a) to Jacques’s conduct 
as alleged in Count 1 of the indictment is constitutional.235 
The court’s opinion in Jacques is thus a perfect example of a Lopez 
Second Category jurisdictional-elements provision working as it is 
supposed to.  Because a defendant has the opportunity to move to 
dismiss the charge in an “as-applied” challenge—as Jacques did 
here—no decision by a federal prosecutor to exercise concurrent ju-
risdiction in a kidnapping case can hope to escape scrutiny.  Courts 
will be required to examine the government’s factual allegations even 
prior to trial to determine whether the use of interstate commerce 
facilities is too attenuated from the crime itself to support federal 
conviction.  If the allegations are sufficient, the court will allow the 
charge to proceed to trial, where the defendant will have another 
opportunity to argue attenuation to the jury.  As discussed below, 
properly formulated jury instructions will make crystal clear that the 
government must prove federal nexus beyond a reasonable doubt in 
order to support conviction.  The prospect of a defendant using his 
cell phone to order a pizza on the way to commit a crime thus sub-
jecting himself to unwarranted federal prosecution is an alarmist 
specter with no basis in reality. 
3.  A Proposal for Ensuring Proper Federal Nexus Review Through Jury 
Instructions 
In order to lay to rest the infinite jurisdiction specter permanent-
ly, this Article proposes that the Augustin “more than a mere inciden-
 
234 Id. at *12. 
235 Id. 
268 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1 
 
tal use” language discussed above236 be adopted by federal district 
courts and studied by federal prosecutors seeking to understand the 
proper limits to federal jurisdiction under the case.  This could easily 
be implemented by federal district courts through jury instructions.  
Courts formulating jury instructions in Lopez Second Category juris-
dictional elements statutes already instruct juries that the government 
must prove use of the interstate commerce facility beyond a reasona-
ble doubt.237  Courts should now specify, when instructing on the 
usage element under § 1201(a)(1), that the defendant must have 
used the interstate commerce facility to further the kidnapping, and 
that this usage must be “more than . . . mere[ly] incidental.”238 
Such a requirement would forever banish farfetched infinite ju-
risdiction hypotheticals.  If the defendant got hungry in the middle of 
a kidnapping and called Domino’s to order a pizza, or if he used the 
Internet to check the weather, the usage would not meet the “more 
than merely incidental” requirement and would therefore be insuffi-
cient to support the exercise of federal jurisdiction.  Defendants in 
such cases would be unlikely to be charged federally, because prose-
cutors would realize they lacked the requisite proof on a required 
element of the crime.  (Indeed, there is simply no evidence that fed-
eral authorities currently bring kidnapping charges based on such at-
tenuated usages.)  If they were charged, however, defendants would 
likely prevail on as-applied challenges to their indictment, or be ac-
quitted by juries.  But where the defendant used the anonymity of 
emails and text messages to lure the defendant into a trap—as Sarah 
Ochoa did, and as Michael Jacques did with Brooke Bennett—or 
made telephone calls to arrange for payment of ransom as occurred 
in the Augustin case, then the usage of interstate commerce facilities 
would be deemed more than merely incidental.  In those cases, de-
fendants would properly be subject to federal prosecution. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress’s plenary authority under the Commerce Clause to regu-
late the facilities of interstate commerce and prevent their use for 
harmful purposes, even where the harmful use arises solely within the 
 
236 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
237 See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, No. 06 CR 70, 2007 WL 1385382, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 
2007) (upholding jury instruction in murder-for-hire case requiring proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt “that the defendant knowingly used or caused another to use a facility of 
interstate commerce” in committing the crime). 
238 United States v. Augustin, No. 1:09-CR-187, 2010 WL 2639966, at *4 (E.D.Tenn. June 28, 
2010) (emphasis added). 
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boundaries of a single state, has long been established.  The triumvi-
rate of modern Commerce Clause cases—Lopez, Morrison, and Raich—
only cement this principle.  The modern federalist critique lodged 
against the amended Federal Kidnapping Act, and by extension 
against other Lopez First and Second Category jurisdictional-
elements statutes, is unavailing as a matter of doctrine.  Its persuasive 
power has come instead from hyperbolic scenarios of “infinite federal 
jurisdiction” that are factual in nature and divorced from current 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  While this Article maintains that 
the threat of infinitely expansive federal jurisdiction urged by mod-
ern federalists is overblown, a practical and moderate change to the 
application of the amended Federal Kidnapping Act that would lay to 
rest such federalism concerns once and for all.  By requiring that the 
already applicable federal nexus requirement of § 1201(a)(1) be im-
plemented through jury instructions requiring “more than a merely 
incidental use” of interstate commerce facilities, federal jurisdiction 
over that appropriately limited number of intrastate kidnappings 
would be unassailable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
